Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
Volume 21

Issue 2

Article 2

2004

"Don't Ask, Don't Tell": A Qualified Defense
Eugene R. Milhizer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Milhizer, Eugene R. (2004) ""Don't Ask, Don't Tell": A Qualified Defense," Hofstra Labor & Employment Law
Journal: Vol. 21 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol21/iss2/2

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

Milhizer: "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": A Qualified Defense

"DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL":
A QUALIFIED DEFENSE
Eugene R. Milhizer*

I. INTRODUCTION

When I was asked to participate in the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell: 10
Years Later" conference at Hofstra University, I was honored and
pleased to share my thoughts and experiences relating to the current policy for military service by homosexuals with the conferees and others in
attendance. When I learned that I was slated to appear in a roundtable
entitled "Justifications for the Policy," however, I became a little less
sanguine. The source of my concern was that the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell"' approach toward military service by homosexuals cannot really be
justified, at least in terms of it being a coherent expression of unadulterated principles. This should not be surprising, as even those involved in
* Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law; B.A. (High Distinction), University of Michigan, 1976; J.D. University of Michigan School of Law, 1979; LL.M. (First Honor
Graduate), The Judge Advocate General's School, 1988. The author served as a Judge Advocate in
the United States Army for 21 years, and has written numerous articles on criminal law and procedure, and military topics. The author wishes to thank Tulsi Rogers and Albert A. Starkus III for their
significant contributions as research assistants. The author especially wants to thank two colleagues-Professor Kevin Lee, for his generous and invaluable mentoring regarding the philosophical positions discussed in this article and to Professor Patrick Quirk, for his insight and guidance.
The Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal is pleased to publish this article in this
Symposium issue. This Symposium issue was inspired by Hofstra University's Don't Ask, Don't
Tell: 10 Years Later Conference held on September 18-20, 2003 at Hofstra University.
1. Apparently the full title of the current Pentagon policy is "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't
Harass." Linda D Kozaryn & Jim Garamone, Cohen Adds 'Don't Harass' to Homosexual Policy,
Says it Can Work, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 29, 1999, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/ n12291999 9912291.html (Former Defense Secretary
William S. Cohen expanded "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Harass");
see GARY L. LEHRING, OFFICIALLY GAY: THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY BY THE

U.S. MILITARY 141 (2003). The much more familiar nomenclature-"Don't Ask, Don't Tell"--was
coined after the policy was initially implemented in 1993, and it has become a shorthand and generic reference to all of the contemporary legislation and policies relating to military service by homosexuals. Unless otherwise indicated, the phrase "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is likewise used in this
general sense in this article.
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establishing the policy never claimed that their final product rested on
firm moral bedrock. Quite to the contrary, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
regime, as ultimately implemented, is an awkward and transparent compromise, cobbled together by those holding diametrically opposing
views toward military service by homosexuals in particular, and homosexuality in general. That the policy is incoherent and unprincipled can
easily be demonstrated-ask anyone on either side of the issue and they
candidly will tell you that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is fundamentally
misguided and, ultimately, fatally flawed.
But despite its many faults, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" approach is
explainable. More than this, it is even defensible in the limited sense that
it is a relatively workable and effective approach to the contentious set
of issues it addresses, especially when it is contrasted with the philosophically pristine alternatives suggested by ideologues of different
stripes. 2 It is also largely reconcilable with the deeply conflicted attitudes and beliefs of the American public with respect to homosexuality
generally, and to the variety of attendant issues relating to military service by homosexuals. In order to understand this measured defense of
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime, it is first necessary to appreciate the
forces that lead to its creation.
2. Critics on both sides argue that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" has an adverse impact on military
efficiency, and thus it is unworkable and ineffective. Those in favor of lifting or relaxing the ban
point out that many homosexuals have served with distinction in the armed forces, and that the separation of some homosexuals has seriously damaged the military's ability to fill certain critical specialties. See, e.g., Kevin Howe, Gay Soldiers Booted From Defense Language Institute, MONTEREY
COUNTY HERALD, Nov. 15, 2002 (six of nine gay soldiers discharged were students of the indemand Arabic language program at the military school), available at http://www.lexis.com. Those
on the opposite side argue that the time, cost, and effort associated with the current policy is much
more draining upon military effectiveness and resources than was the prior, more restrictive policy.
See Robert H. Knight, Don'tAsk, Don't Tell... Don't Discharge,CITIZEN, 2002, available at
http://www.family.org/cforum/citizenmag/features/a0020962.cfn (although not arguing in favor of
a ban, the author refers to the estimated cost of $35,000 per discharged service member, who might
not have been accepted if screened for homosexuality as done prior to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," and
to the recoupment sought based on a $70,000 judgment against a doctor educated using military
funds, who "came out" twelve days before reporting for duty). Neither side, however, can seriously
claim that the current policy has significantly compromised military effectiveness. In this regard, it
should be noted that little more than 1000 service members are separated annually for homosexuality. Jim Garamone, DoD Approves 'Don'tAsk, Don't Tell, Don't Harass' Plans, FDCH FED. DEP'T
AND AGENCY DOCUMENTS, Feb. 2, 2000, available at http://www.lexis.com. Further, the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" legislation provides:
Nothing in [this statute] shall be construed to require that a member of the armed forces
be processed for separation from the armed forces when a determination is made in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense that.., separation of
the member would not be in the best interest of the armed forces.
See 10 U.S.C. § 654(c) (2000). A detailed comparison of the relative workability and effectiveness
of alternative approaches to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is beyond the scope of this article.
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE POLICY

The origins of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" approach, in many
ways, typify how the contemporary American political processes address
contested moral issues. It was forged in a maelstrom of two clashing cultural ideologies, each based on an irreconcilable normative imperative.
A series of tactics and counter-tactics ensued, ultimately resulting in a
compromise of sorts that none dared call victory. As I distinctly remember one wag remarking at the time, the only thing "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" had to recommend it is that it was universally despised.3
The first step in the chain of events that led to the removal of the
military's old policy on homosexuality,4 and the implementation of the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime, was the campaign promises of thenPresidential candidate Bill Clinton. Clinton pledged during his 1992
campaign to "lift the ban" on homosexuals in the military, 5 which had
3.
Conservatives and liberals agree that President Bill Clinton's effort to lift the military's
gay ban was perhaps one of the greatest blunders of his tenure in office. Conservatives
argue that Clinton should have left well enough alone; liberals believe that he should
have ordered the military to accept homosexuals rather than agreeing to the compromise
'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy.
DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL 201 (Aaron Belkin & Geoffrey Bateman eds., Lynne Rienner 2003).
"His [Clinton's] sudden and ineffectual attempt to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military won
him the further contempt of the military but no applause from the Republic's militant gays." R.
EMMETT TYRRELL, JR., BOY CLINTON: THE POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 287 (1996).
4. A Reagan Administration policy regarding military service by homosexuals was passed in
the early 1980s. JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY
POLICY 19, 27-34 (1999). In essence, the old policy provided that "[h]omosexuality [is] incompatible with military service." The policy, therefore, "authorized military officials to determine not only
what servicemembers did but what they desired and intended, all with the aim of determining who
they were." Id. at 27. In this sense, the underlying premise for the military's homosexual policy was
unchanged by "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," although its implementation proved to be quite different.
See id. at 48-56.
5. "With the presidential election of 1992, the issue of gays in the military rose to the forefront when President-elect Bill Clinton stated during his campaign that he was in favor of repealing
the regulations prohibiting homosexuals from serving in the armed forces." Aaron A. Seamon, The
Ask, Don't Tell"
Flawed Compromise of 1O U.S.C. § 654: An Assessment of the Military's "Don 't
Policy, 24 U. DAYTON L. REv. 319, 324 (1998). "One of President Clinton's 1992 campaign promises was to eliminate the ban on Gays in the military .... Scott Morris, Europe Enters a New Millennium with Gays in the Military While the United States Drowns in Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Twin
Decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 423, 431
(2001). As Lou Cannon reported at the time,
Former Army colonel Margarethe Cammermeyer is awaiting the inauguration of President-elect Clinton in confidence that he 'absolutely' will carry out his promise to end the
ban against homosexuals in the military.
Cammermeyer, who served 27 years in uniform and won the Bronze Star in Vietnam,
has been fighting a different kind of battle since she was discharged six months ago for
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officially existed in varying forms in the United States since World War
11.6 This ignited a firestorm of political activity even before Clinton took
office which was enthusiastically stoked by those on all sides and threatened to paralyze the new administration before it even began. 7 Legislators from both parties proposed a bill codifying the then-existing homosexual ban.8 The Joint Chiefs of Staff were openly opposed to change, 9
acknowledging during a 1989 security-clearance interview that she is a lesbian.
During his campaign, Clinton saluted her at a televised town meeting and told her that he
would end the ban against homosexuals in the military if elected.
Lou Cannon, Discharged Gay Colonel Pins Hopes on Clinton 's Promise, WASH. POST, Dec. 29,
1992, at A3 (emphasis added). Indeed, from the moment Clinton was elected, speculation began
with respect to his campaign promise to end the ban and whether he would fulfill it.
Bill Clinton's victory on Tuesday may render moot the controversy over the ban on gays
in the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), a Department of Defense policy which
conflicts with MIT's nondiscrimination policy. If Clinton ends the ban, MIT will continue to allow the three ROTC units to remain on campus, according to MIT officials.
Reversing the military's gay ban has been one of Clinton's campaign promises. "Clinton
has said publicly that he would reverse the directive, which means the change could be
as simple as signing an executive order ....Also, groups [including MIT] that have
been following the issue will provide pressure on the Clinton administration," said Sarah
E. Gallup, staff person of the ROTC Working Group at MIT.
Hyun Soo Kim, ROTC Ban on Gays Faces Reversal under Clinton, 112 THE TECH 1, 1 (Nov. 6,
1992), at http://www-tech.mit.eduV 112/N55/rotc.55n.html.
6. Morris, supra note 5, at 431. Before World War II, there was no official policy in the
United States concerning military service by homosexuals. Instead, the military used sodomy statutes and other unofficial policies to exclude and separate homosexuals from service. See Walter
John Krygowski, Comment, Homosexuality and the Military Mission: The Failure of.the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" Policy, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 875, 879 (1995). Sodomy was first proscribed by
military criminal law in 1917. See id. at n.37 (tracing the development of prohibitions on sodomy
from 1917 to present); see also infra note 45.
7. As Barton Gellman explains:
President-elect Clinton, torn between gay rights supporters and advisers who fear upheaval in the U.S. armed forces, yesterday reaffirmed a campaign pledge to permit acknowledged homosexuals in military service but said he would "consult with a lot of
people" for an indefinite time "about what our options are."
His statement, which soft-pedaled a more specific promise to sign an "immediate repeal"
of the ban on homosexuals, gave hope to both sides of the most explosive social question
to face the uniformed services in decades. It may buy him time in his presidential transition, but he cannot easily dodge the question once he takes office.
Barton Gellman, Clinton Says He 'll 'Consult' on Allowing Gays in Military: Advisers Warn of
Likely Repercussions, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1992, at AI (emphasis added),
8. HALLEY, supra note 4, at 21.
9. Some retired officers, who were not bound by the chain of command, were even more
vocal. As former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer said in an interview at the
time,
"Mr. Clinton is making a big mistake,"... "as he will damn well find out." Moorer says
what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff means when he says allowing gays in the
military has "significant issues of privacy associated with it." "Soldiers and sailors,"
Moorer drawls, "don't like to take showers with those who like to take showers with soldiers and sailors."
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with some even threatening resignation.' 0 Democratic Majority Leader,
George J. Mitchell, reported a block of 70 senators who objected to relaxing the prohibitions.1 1 Most importantly, a solid majority of the
American public disapproved of both homosexuality and Clinton's initiative, 12 and this sentiment was swiftly and vociferously communicated
to members of Congress. 13 As Gary Lehring writes:
Larry Doyle, Hey Sailor: I Want You for the U.S. Navy, SPY, Mar. 1993, available at
http://www.davidclemens.com/gaymilitary/spy93.htm (emphasis in the original). Currently serving
military members were less vociferous but no less determined. "Refusing to concede defeat on integrating gays into the military, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are quietly promoting a policy
that would discourage homosexuals from openly declaring their sexual orientation by barring those
that do from combat units, a senior defense official said Tuesday." Richard H.P. Sia, Top Military
Officers Favor Gays Staying in Closet, BALT. SUN, Feb. 23, 1993, at 4.
10. HALLEY supra note 4, at 20.
Yesterday's statement followed a behind-the-scenes campaign by members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, working through retired Adm. William J. Crowe Jr. and Rep. Dave
McCurdy (D-Okla.) to convince Clinton that he will face serious repercussions in military ranks if he makes the change. Army Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan and other chiefs are
urging Clinton to appoint a presidential commission "to study it for a year or two," according to an official knowledgeable about the lobbying effort.
The alternative could be costly. Two members of the Joint Chiefs are said by associates
to be ready to resign over the issue, though such reports may prove exaggerated. "Strategically, given his background, he [Clinton] can't afford this fight with his military establishment," the official said. "Politically, he just can't do it. So what you do is you
study it. You say, 'I want to get the right answer but I want to do what's best for the national security.' That takes it off the agenda."
Gellman, supra note 7, Al, A 11(emphasis added). Another source reported that a survey conducted
June 2, 1993 through June 21, 1993, entitled, "Congressional Survey of All Active-Duty Admirals
and Generals Shows Overwhelming Opposition to Lifting Military Gay Ban," reflected that 97.5%
opposed homosexuals serving in the military, and over 90% questioned the impact on "national security" if homosexuals are allowed to serve. David Barton, Homosexuals in the Military, WALL
BUILDERS, availableat

http://www.wallbuilders.com/resources/search/detailpf.php?ResourcelD=8 (last visited Mar. 19,
2004).
11. HALLEY, supra note 4, at 21.
12. As Tom Smith, the Director of the General Social Survey at the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, observed at the time, "The basic survey finding is that
moral approval of homosexuality during the past 20 years has shown very little change, and what
little change there is has been a slight hardening of attitudes." Richard Morin, American Attitudes
Toward Gays Remain Steady, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1993. Smith was commenting on survey results
that showed that a strong majority of Americans believed that homosexual relations between consenting adults should not be legal. Id. A Gallup poll taken July 9, 1993 through July 11, 1993 asked:
In order to deal with the issue of gays in the military, President Clinton has adopted a
plan called "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." According to this plan, the military no longer asks
personnel whether or not they are homosexual. But if personnel reveal that they ARE
homosexual, AND they engage in homosexual activity, they will be discharged from the
military. Do you support or oppose that plan?
GALLUP POLL OF PUB. OPINION OF MILITARY AND NAT'L DEF., SATELLITE NEWS Gov'T
PROCUREMENT REPORT (2000), available at http://www.defensedaily.com/reports/pub opinion.htm

[hereinafter GALLUP POLL 2000]. The responses were evenly divided-48% supported the plan,
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Clinton's attempt to lift the military ban provided political drama for
weeks. Pressure groups, both pro and con, organized White House and
congressional telephone and letter-writing campaigns. Even the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in efforts, that bordered on insubordination and the
subversion of civilian authority over the military, entered the political
process unabashedly, lobbying members of Congress behind the scenes
and opening up their phone lines for public comment. The organized
opposition came from conservative religious groups and other members of the political right. The Reverend Louis Sheldon of the Traditional Values Coalition boasted that his group's numerous calls virtually shut down the telephone lines at the Capitol, and
Oliver North
14
made public pleas for money to stop the Clinton plan.

Clinton intended to lift the ban via an executive order. 15 Those in
favor of such an order included advocates for the gay, lesbian, bisexual,
and transgender (GLBT) community, who urged a policy of equal treatment for homosexuals in the armed forces, contending that sexual orientation and consensual conduct has no bearing on a person's ability to
serve in the military.' 6 The GLBT constituency was important to President Clinton's election,' 7 and, not surprisingly, Clinton was initially in-

49% opposed it, and 3% had no opinion. Id. Interestingly, there was little change in attitude when
the same question was asked in December 1999-50% supported the plan, 46% opposed it, and 4%
had no opinion. Id.
13. "The general public reacted [to the proposed easing of the policy] with spontaneous, unorganized outrage. Many congressional offices needed extra staff to answer thousands of phone
calls and letters protesting the president's move." The Homosexual Exclusion Law vs. The Clinton
"Don 'tAsk, Don't Tell" Policy, CENTER FOR MILITARY READINESS, Jan. 7, 2002, at
http://cmrlink.org/HMilitary.asp?doclD= 103 [hereinafter CMR].
14. LEHRING, supra note 1,at 137.
15. Presumably, this executive order would have been similar to the order issued by President
Truman that mandated the racial desegregation of the military.
[R]acial segregation remained official government policy until President Harry Truman's
historic Executive Order 998 1, issued a few months before the 1948 election, which "declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or
national origin." Following this order, the armed forces began slowly to institute a policy
of racial desegregation.
Lesbians and Gay Men in the U.S. Military: HistoricalBackground, 2003, at
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/militaryhistory.html. The practical efficacy of such an
order, however, is not so clear had Congress opposed it. The legislative branch, of course, is not
under executive control, and it has its own source of constitutional authority over the military and
appropriations. Article I of the United States Constitution provides, inter alia, that Congress has the
power "lt]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" and "[n]o
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."
U.S. CONST,art. I, §§ 8-9.
16. See HALLEY supranote 4, at 20.
17. See id.
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tent on fulfilling his promise to them. Accordingly, only days after assuming office Clinton directed Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to prepare a draft executive order revising the existing Department of Defense
(DoD) policy, and to submit it to him by July 15, 1993.18
Congress, however, seized the initiative by adopting a separate plan
proposed by Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell.' 9 Among other
provisions, the legislation required the Secretary of Defense to review
the homosexual policy then in place and submit recommended changes
to the President and to Congress.2 ° In addition, it required the Senate
Armed Services Committee to hold hearings during the Secretary's review and, later, to examine the Secretary's report and recommendations.2 1 Accordingly, this plan involved Congress intimately in the polIn the 1992 presidential campaign, President Clinton went out of his way to court the
support of the lesbian/gay community in this country by saying that he supported the
right of lesbians and gays to enter the military. As the first major party presidential candidate to take this stand, lesbians and gays flocked to his campaign with their time,
money, and votes.
Brian McNeill, Democrats Betray Their Lesbian/Gay Supporters,NEW UNION PARTY (2003) at
http://wwwl.minn.net/-nup/NUPARTIC.HTM (last visited Mar. 1, 2004) (emphasis added). It was
reported that "[i]n the 1992 presidential election, homosexual activist groups contributed more than
$3 million to the Clinton/Gore campaign." CMR, supra note 13, at
http://cmrlink.org/HMilitary.asp?doclD=103. Clinton continued to court the support of the GLBT
constituency long after the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime was implemented. In fact, near the end
of his first term, "Bill Clinton became the first president ever to publicly address a gay and lesbian
civil-rights group when he spoke at a fund-raiser for the Human Rights Campaign, a national gay
and lesbian lobby group in Washington, D.C." Mubarak S. Dahir, Clinton Works the Gays, WEEKLY
WIRE, Nov. 24, 1997, at http://www.weeklywire.comlww/t 1-24-97/memphis viewp.html.
18. Memorandum from President William J. Clinton, to the Secretary of Defense (Jan. 29,
1993), at
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/01/1993-01-29-memorandum-for-the-secretary-of-defense.htm.
19. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 601, 107 Stat. 28-29 (1993).
This was part of the so-called "Sense of the Congress" legislation, which provided in pertinent part:
It is the sense of the Congress that:
(a) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a comprehensive review of current departmental policy with respect to the service of homosexuals in the Armed Forces;
(b) Such review shall include the basis for the current policy of mandatory separation;
the rights of all service men and women, and the effects of any change in such policy on
morale, discipline, and military effectiveness;
(c) The Secretary shall report the results of such review and consultations and his recommendations to the President and to the Congress no later than July 15, 1993;
(d) The Senate Committee on Armed Services shall conduct
(i) comprehensive hearings on the current military policy with respect to the service of homosexuals in the military services; and
(ii) shall conduct oversight hearings on the Secretary's recommendations as such
are reported.
Id.
20. Id. at 28.
21. Id. at 29.
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icy-making process, and it could have portended legislation and implementation requirements that categorically banned homosexuals from
serving in the military.
In early summer 1993, following hearings before the Senate Armed
Services Committee and much debate, a compromise solution of sorts
emerged that was quickly dubbed "Don't Ask, Don't Tell. 22 It was
by homocomprised of the basic legislation addressing military service 24
sexuals, 23 and several implementing directives and regulations.
The statute set forth a comprehensive list of findings, which were
decidedly disapproving of military service by homosexuals.2 5 Among the
22. See HALLEY, supranote 4, at 15.
23. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571,
107 Stat. 1547 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000)).
24. See e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1304.26, QUALIFICATIONS STANDARDS FOR
ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT & INDUCTION (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 1304.26]; U.S.
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 1332.14]; U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SIR. 1332.30, SEPARATION OF REGULAR
RESERVE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 1332.30].'
25. In passing the bill, Congress made the following findings:
(1) Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States commits exclusively
to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a
Navy, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces.
(2) There is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces.
(3) Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the
United States, it lies within the discretion of the Congress to establish qualifications for and conditions of service in the armed forces.
(4) The primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare for and to prevail in combat
should the need arise.
(5) The conduct of military operations requires members of the armed forces to make
extraordinary sacrifices, including the ultimate sacrifice, in order to provide for the
common defense.
(6) Success in combat requires military units that are characterized by high morale,
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion.
(7) One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, that is, the
bonds of trust among individual service members that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the individual unit members.
(8) Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that (A) the extraordinary responsibilities of the armed forces, the unique conditions
of military service, and the critical role of unit cohesion, require that the military community, while subject to civilian control, exist as a specialized society; and
(B) the military society is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal behavior, that would not
be acceptable in civilian society.
(9) The standards of conduct for members of the armed forces regulate a member's life
for 24 hours each day beginning at the moment the member enters military status
and not ending until that person is discharged or otherwise separated from the
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findings was that the "prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of military law that continues to be necessary in the
unique circumstances of military service"; 26 and, that "persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would
create an unacceptable risk to the high standards or morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."'27 Based on these findings, Congress required, with some exceptions, that a service member be separated from the military for engaging
in homosexual acts, for making a statement indicating status as a homosexual or bisexual, or for marrying or attempting to marry someone of
the same biological sex. 28 Advocates on both sides of the issue have
armed forces.
(10) Those standards of conduct, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice, apply
to a member of the armed forces at all times that the member has a military status,
whether the member is on base or off base, and whether the member is on duty or
off duty.
(11) The pervasive application of the standards of conduct is necessary because members of the armed forces must be ready at all times for worldwide deployment to a
combat environment.
(12) The worldwide deployment of United States military forces, the international responsibilities of the United States, and the potential for involvement of the armed
forces in actual combat routinely make it necessary for members of the armed
forces involuntarily to accept living conditions and working conditions that are often spartan, primitive, and characterized by forced intimacy with little or no privacy.
(13) The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of military
law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of military service.
(14) The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons whose
presence in the armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the armed
forces' high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that
are the essence of military capability.
(15) The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high
standards or morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.
10 U.S.C. § 654(a). The Secretary of Defense later formed a Military Working Group (MWG) to
help in the development and implementation of the statute; the MWG likewise found that allowing
open homosexuals to serve in the Armed Forces would be detrimental to unit cohesion, readiness,
military effectiveness, recruiting and retention. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, REPORT 5,
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP, § III (Findings) (July 1, 1993), availableat
http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/milworkgroup.pdf [hereinafter MWG SUMMARY REPORT].

26. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13).
27. Id.§ 654(a)(15).
28. The legislative policy was expressed as follows:
(b) POLICY. - A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed
forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of
the following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures set
forth in such regulations:
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characterized this codification as a failure on Clinton's part to advance
the GLBT agenda, and as a future limitation on the power of the President to remove or change the policy by executive order. 29 This statute
remains in effect today, without change.3 °
The Department of Defense (DoD) was left with the unenviable
task of fashioning and implementing a policy that both conformed to
3
Congress' expressed disapproval of military service by homosexuals 1

(1)

(2)

(3)

That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to
engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are further findings, made and
approved in accordance with procedures set forth in such regulations, that the
member has demonstrated that (A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior;
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's continued
presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of the armed
forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts.
That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words
to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made and approved in accordance
with procedures set forth in the regulations, that the member has demonstrated
that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the
same biological sex.

Id. § 654(b).
29. See HALLEY, supra note 4, at 23-24.
30. "On Sept. 9, 1993, the Senate rejected an amendment offered by Sen. Barbara Boxer, (DCA), who tried to strike language in the 1994 Defense Authorization bill that codified the homosexual ban. The roll-call vote was 63-33. On Sept. 28, the House rejected a similar amendment by Rep.
Martin Meehan (D-MA). According to the National Security Councilf the roll-call vote was 264169." CMR, supra note 13, at http://cmrlink.orgfHMilitary.asp?doclD= 103.
3 1. "The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the standards for enlistment and appointment
of members of the armed forces reflect the policies set forth in subsection (b)." § 654(c)(1). Later, in
a memorandum for members of the Republican Conference, Rep. Steve Buyer (R-IN), the Chairman
of the Military Personnel Subcommittee wrote,
[T]here is no evidence to suggest that the Congress believed the new law to be anything
other than a continuation of a firm prohibition against military service for homosexuals
that had been the historical policy.
The law, as well as the accompanying legislative findings and explanatory report language, makes absolutely clear that known homosexuals, identified based on acts or self
admission, must be separated from the military. After extensive testimony and debate,
the Congress made a calculated judgment to confirm the continued bar to the service of
homosexuals in the military.
Those that claim the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy has failed simply do not understand
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and accommodated the desires and promises to lift the ban of a retrenching Commander-in-Chief. Leaving the particulars of resulting DoD implementing procedures aside, its clear thrust was to distinguish between
homosexual conduct and homosexual orientation, with only the former
serving as a legitimate basis for separation from the service.3 2 The implementation regime also forbade unfounded (or under-founded) investigations of alleged homosexuality, requiring that certain particularized
thresholds of certainty be satisfied before a command-directed inquiry
could even be undertaken. 33 It likewise prohibits inquiry of service
the underlying law. The prospect of a homosexual openly serving in the military was
never contemplated by the Congress and any policy that suggests that the military should
be receptive to the service of homosexuals is in direct violation of the law.
CMR, supra note 13, at http://cmrlink.org/HMilitary.asp?doclD=103.
32. For example, one DoD Directive instructs:
E1.2.8 Provisions Related to Homosexual Conduct
EI.2.8.1 A person's sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and
is not a bar to [military] service entry or continued service unless manifested by homosexual conduct .... Applicants for enlistment, appointment, or induction shall not be
asked or required to reveal whether they are heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual. Applicants also will not be asked or required to reveal whether they have engaged in homosexual conduct, unless independent evidence is received indicating that an applicant engaged in such conduct or unless the applicant volunteers a statement that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect.
EI.2.8.2 Homosexual conduct is grounds for barring entry into the Armed Forces ....
Homosexual conduct is a homosexual act, a statement by the applicant that demonstrates
a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, or a homosexual marriage or attempted marriage. Propensity to engage in homosexual acts means more than an abstract
preference or desire to engage in homosexual acts; it indicates a likelihood that a person
engages in or will engage in homosexual acts.
DOD DIR. 1304.26, supra note 24, at El.2.8.1-El .2.8.2.
33.
6.2 Upon the receipt of any allegation of adult private consensual sexual misconduct, the
commander shall review the allegation. If the commander determines that there is credible information of adult private consensual sexual misconduct, the commander may request a criminal investigation by the DCIO or other DoD law enforcement organization,
as appropriate.
6.2.1 If a commander requests that a DCIO initiate a criminal investigation into adult
private consensual sexual misconduct, the Commander or Director of the DCIO, and
those managers or supervisors approved by the Commander or Director to do so, shall
independently evaluate and make a determination whether the request is based on credible information of adult private consensual sexual misconduct prior to initiating a criminal investigation.
6.2.2 If a DCIO determines that a request from a commander lacks credible information
of adult private consensual sexual misconduct, or is not in keeping with established policy, the matter will be returned to the commander, without action, for appropriate disposition.
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 5505.8, INVESTIGATIONS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY THE
DEFENSE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER DOD LAW ENFORCEMENT

ORGANIZATIONS,

6 (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter DOD. INSTR. 5505.8].
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members and prospective recruits concerning homosexual acts and orientation.3 4 Although some of the procedures have been modified from
time to time, the aim of the DoD policy remains substantially the same
as when it was first introduced about a decade ago.35
The DoD's approach to implementation had a sort of superficial respectability and coherence, at least in the abstract. Personal thoughts or
beliefs concerning homosexuality were not to be pried into or punished,
and intimate conduct that was purely private in nature was not to be investigated.3 6 Moreover, the DoD conspicuously avoided taking a stand
34. Applicants for enlistment, appointment, or induction shall not be asked or required to reveal their sexual orientation. DOD DIR. 1304.26, supranote 24, at El .2.8.1.
35. In April 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen ordered a review of the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy, which was prompted by reports of increased military discharges due to homosexuality. The review, completed a year later, concluded that discharges for homosexuality have
increased since "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" had been implemented, but offered no definitive explanation for this increase. Report from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness), to the Secretary of Defense (Apr. 1998), availableat
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/rpt040798.html. Certain DoD officials speculated that some service members declared themselves to be homosexual solely to leave the military with an honorable discharge.
Elizabeth Becker, Harassment in the Military is Said to Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A14. In
the summer of 1999, Army Private First Class (PFC) Barry Winchell was beaten to death with a
baseball bat because he was rumored to be a homosexual. See United States v. Fisher, 58 M.J. 300,
301 (2003). Prompted by this and other allegations of violence and harassment toward homosexuals,
DoD officials published a series of memoranda insisting that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" can be successfully implemented provided commanders and others are properly trained on the policy, and that
its provisions are effectively communicated at all levels. Jim Garamone, DoD Clarifies "Don'tAsk,
Don't Tell" Policy, AM. PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 1999, availableat
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Augl999/n08131999_9908133.html.
Secretary Cohen stated:
"I've instructed the military services to make sure that the policy is clearly understood and fairly
enforced." News Release, United States Department of Defense, Defense Department Issues More
Guidelines Concerning Implementation of Homosexual Conduct Policy (Aug. 13, 1999), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Augl999/bO8131999_bt381-99.html. The memorandum required that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy be incorporated in the training of commanders, supervisors, and law enforcement personnel. Id. Some sources report, however, that anti-homosexual
harassment in the military has substantially increased in recent years. See Becker, supra; Gregory
Vistica, One, Two, Three, Out: How Two Topflight Soldiers Lost Their Dream, and the Army Lost
Them, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 2000, at 57. See John W. Bicknell, Jr., Study of Naval Officers' Attitudes Toward Homosexuals in the Military 1-3 (2000) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School) (on file with author), for a collection of many of the quoted sources cited in this footnote.
The policy has been repeatedly challenged as unconstitutional in the courts, but to no avail. See,
e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cir. 1998); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1421
(9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 258 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d
915, 919 (4th Cir. 1996).
36. See MWG SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 25, § IV (Conclusions) (determining that service members would not be required to answer questions concerning their orientation), at
http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/milgroup.pdf. See also Pat Towell, The Fine Points of Controversy, 51 CONG. Q. 1967 (July 24, 1993) (reporting that associating with gays, marching in a gay
rights' parade while wearing civilian clothes or subscribing to a homosexual publication would not
be grounds for initiating an investigation).
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on the morality of homosexuality. The policy's stated objectives were
instead couched in strikingly pragmatic and non-judgmental terms overt homosexuality was to be purged because it damaged unit cohesion,
moral and discipline, and not because it was immoral or illegal.37 Even
the broader policy goals that purportedly undergirded the implementation regime, such as promoting recruiting and enhancing
retention, were
38
described in a dispassionate and utilitarian fashion.
The predictable impact of the implemented policy might likewise
appear to be both reasonable and benign. Military effectiveness presumably would not be undermined by the compromise approach because
it correctly recognized that mere thoughts, beliefs or orientation relating
to homosexuality, unaccompanied action or overt expression, would not
be harmful to military effectiveness. Similarly, homosexuals' privacy
interests seemingly would be fully respected, as intimate homosexual
conduct would be outside the purview of official action provided it remained discreet. Only obvious and public expressions of homosexuality
-unambiguous actions or words-were supposed to be investigated or
used as a basis for separation or adverse action. 39 The policy thus
achieved an ostensibly prudent accommodation for military service by
homosexuals-they could serve consistent with the goal of military effectiveness if, with respect to their sexuality, they did so surreptipay for one
tiously. 40 This, it was argued, was not too steep a price to
41
force.
all-volunteer
an
in
serve
to
motivated
truly
was
who
Although the above referenced concerns about unit cohesion, morale and the like were no doubt relevant to many law makers and their
constituents, these matters were not, in my judgment, the driving force
behind the intensity of the debate and the creation of the compromise solution. The issue of military service by homosexuals was not the typical
37. Sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and homosexual orientation is not a bar to military service, entry, or continued service unless manifested by homosexual
conduct. DOD DIR. 1304.26, supra note 24, at E1.2.8.1.
38. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13)-(14) (2000).
39. See Garamone, supra note 2 (reporting that in fiscal year 1999, about 83.5% of the 1034
service members discharged pursuant to "Don't' Ask, Don't Tell" went to their commanders and
declared their homosexuality), at http:www.lexis.com.
40. See Towell, supranote 36 at 1967 (describing the compromise policy as one in which the
military must not "ask" or "hunt," and homosexual service members must not "tell" or "touch").
41. See Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces Hearings Before the House
Committee on Armed Services, 103d Cong. (2d Sess. 1993) (statement of Les Aspin, Secretary of
Defense), available at http://dont.stanford.edu/doclist.html ("Military service requires sacrifice....
[This] compromise permits gays and lesbian Americans to serve if they are willing to keep their
orientation a private matter. It's a sacrifice we ask them to make, and it's a sacrifice that we believe
is necessary for the overall good of the service.").
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grist for the legislative mill, where costs and benefits are routinely calibrated with the goal of achieving optimal (or at least relative) utility or
efficiency. 42 Here, the governmental processes operated in a fundamentally different way than in the more mundane case, as, for example,
when the political branches determine the amount of a tax, subsidy, or
appropriation. 43 For those who cared most deeply, the issue could be distilled to a single, straightforward, often unspoken proposition-one's
position on whether military service by homosexuals was damaging to
directly with one's position on the
military effectiveness corresponded
44
morality of homosexuality itself.
Accordingly, the laissez-faire veneer toward homosexuality reflected in "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" was and is disingenuous at best. On
the one hand, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime evinces an unmistakable animus toward homosexuality. The newly implemented policy begins with the proposition that heterosexuals and homosexuals ought to
be treated differently, and it reiterates that homosexuality and military
service are generally incompatible. Beyond this, the policy did not dis45
turb Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
42. See Paula Traffe, Note, Imputing the Wealth Maximization Principle to State Legislators,
63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 311, 317 (1987) (distinguishing between legislation that promotes efficiency
and interest group legislation that promotes the interests of a particular group).
43. This is not to say that a taxation policy, for example, does not have an important ideological component. However, the ideological issues raised by a proposed tax bill are generally less
proximate and stark as compared to the circumstances involving "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Even
with respect to less emotionally charged issues, the government's approach often lacks coherence
and unity of purpose. One example is tobacco, where laws and policies simultaneously provide subsidies to tobacco growers, engage in a vigorous anti-smoking campaign, and sue cigarette manufacturers.
44. Parallels can be drawn between the debate about homosexuals serving in the armed forces
and the contemporary debate about abortion. Proponents on both sides make a variety of arguments
in support of their respective positions, such as those relating to the health of the mother, the right to
choose, gender discrimination, equality, and so forth. No doubt these arguments are sincerely made
and may have traction with some who are conflicted or undecided. But reduced to its essence, the
core principle of the abortion debate-another hot spot in the culture war-is whether an unborn
child is actually a human being. If the answer is yes, then few would argue that abortion is moral,
and those who did would be largely disowned by pro-abortion advocates. See, e.g., Naomi Wolf,
Our Bodies, OurSouls, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 1995, at 27, 33 ("But how, one might ask, can
I square a recognition of the humanity of the fetus, and the moral gravity of destroying it, with a
pro-choice position? The answer can only be found in the context of a paradigm abandoned by the
left and misused by the right: the paradigm of sin and redemption.") All of the arguments and
counter-arguments about abortion rights seem to emanate from this fundamental question about the
status-biological, philosophical, and theological--of the unborn child.
45. 10 U.S.C. § 925(a) (2000). The first explicit proscription of sodomy under American military law dates back to the 1916 Article of War, and was clarified in the 1917 edition of the Manual
for Courts-Martial. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, ch. XVII, pt. VI, 443
(2000) [hereinafter MCM]. For a more detailed discussion of sodomy under military criminal law,
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which provides, inter alia, that private sodomy between consenting
adults is a criminal offense.4 6 The statutory language of Article 125,
which describes the actus reus of the crime as "unnatural carnal copulation," clearly expresses a negative moral judgment about homosexual
sodomy.47 Indeed, that private and consensual homosexual sodomy is
proscribed by an enumerated offense under the UCMJ means that the
conduct it reaches has been deemed to-be presumptively prejudicial to
good order and discipline, and of a nature to bring discredit to the armed
forces.48 Further, the fact that forcible sodomy and rape 49 are charged as
see United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52, 53-59 (C.M.A. 1979).
46. § 925(b).
47. The statute expresses the same moral judgment about heterosexual sodomy and bestiality,
providing in pertinent part:
Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense.
Id; see, e.g., United States v. Gates, 40 M.J. 354, 355 (C.M.A. 1994); United States v. Fagg, 34 M.J.
179, 179 (C.M.A 1992); United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174, 178 (C.M.A. 1992) (holding that
there is no constitutionally protected right for heterosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy).
48. The UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946, includes the so-called "Punitive Articles," which is a
listing of crimes and theories of criminal culpability under military law. 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934
(2000). The last of these offenses is found in Article 134, the so-called General Article, which provides, inter alia,
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, [and] all conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. . . of which persons subject to this chapter may
be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial,
according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion
of that court.
Id. § 934 (emphasis added). The enumerated offenses, including sodomy under Article 125 of the
UCMJ, are presumed to be prejudicial to good order and discipline, and of a nature to bring discredit to the armed forces, and thus these detrimental consequences are not set out as explicit elements of proof. In United States v. Foster, 40 M.J. 140, 143 (C.M.A. 1994), the court found,
The enumerated articles are rooted in the principle that such conduct per se is either
prejudicial to good order and discipline or brings discredit to the armed forces; these
elements are implicit in the enumerated articles. Although the Government is not required to prove these elements in an enumerated-article prosecution, they are certainly
present.
In contrast, these consequences must be explicitly pled and proved for unenumerated offenses
charged under Article 134. For example, adultery is punished pursuant to the General Article, and,
therefore, in order for the prosecution to obtain a conviction of adultery, it must plead and prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged misconduct is prejudicial to good order and discipline or
of a nature to bring discredit to the armed forces. MCM, supra note 45, at pt. IV, 62. In United
States v. Poole, 39 M.J. 819, 821 (A.C.M.R. 1994), the court found,
In order to sustain a conviction for adultery under Article 134, UCMJ, not only must the
government prove the existence of a valid marriage and an act of sexual intercourse with
another by one of the parties to the marriage, but also that the act of sexual intercourse
constituted conduct that was prejudicial to good order and discipline.
49. The military's rape statute, § 920(a), provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person subject
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separate enumerated offenses under military law, consistent with the traditional distinction between these crimes, 50 expresses a legislative determination that they violate important but different societal norms. 51 Put
simply, the retention of Articles 120 and 125, without change, is irreconof "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," and
cilable with a benign characterization
52
this.
disputes
seriously
one
no
The incoherence of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" cuts both ways. For
example, if consensual homosexual sodomy were truly a serious offense-as Article 125 provides and 10 U.S.C. § 654 indicates-then one
to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse, by force and without consent, is guilty of
rape." Id. "Sexual intercourse," for purposes of the crime of rape, is defined as "any penetration,
however slight." Id. § 920(c). The statute also proscribes carnal knowledge, describing this offense
as sexual intercourse not amounting to rape, with a person other than the spouse of the accused, or
with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years. Id. § 920(b).
50. Under the common law, rape was defined as "the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly
and against her will." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210

(1966). In other words, the crime was limited to the penetration of the female sex organ by the male
sex organ, i.e., sexual intercourse. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 850 (4th ed. 2003).
There appears to be some disagreement of whether sodomy was a crime under English common
law. Some scholars argue that it was not, but sodomy was instead left to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts and "was made a felony there by early statutes [and] generally assumed to be part
of the American common law." RONALD BOYCE & ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 359 (8th ed. 1999). Others argue that sodomy was part of the English common law.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct.
2472 (2003). In any event, rape and sodomy were traditionally treated as separate and distinct offenses, with Blackstone calling sodomy an offense of "deeper malignity" than rape. BLACKSTONE,
supra at 215. Consistent with the modem approach to sexual offenses, "newer statutes [addressing
the traditional offenses of rape and sodomy] are often drawn in gender-neutral terms and cover not
only genital copulation but also anal and oral copulation and, sometimes, digital and mechanical
penetration as well." LAFAVE, supra at 849.
51. The appellate courts of all of the military services have long held that rape and sodomy
violate different societal norms. United States v. Rogan, 19 M.J. 646, 648 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984), petition denied, 20 M.J. 189 (C.M.A. 1985) (Air Force appellate court holds rape and sodomy arising
out of the same transaction are separately punishable); United States v. Dearman, 7 M.J. 713, 715
(A.C.M.R. 1979), petition denied, 7 M.J. 376 (C.M.A. 1979) (Army appellate court holds attempted
rape and forcible sodomy arising out of the same transaction are separately punishable, because "attempted rape is an offense against the person [and] [slodomy is an 'offense against morals' or a
'crime against nature"'); United States v. Rose, 6 M.J. 754, 757 (N.M.C.M.R. 1978), petition denied, 7 M.J. 56 (C.M.A. 1979) (Navy Marine Corps appellate court holds rape is a crime against the
person and sodomy is an offense against morals or nature).
52. One could rationalize the retention of Article 125 in conjunction with "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" as follows: (1) consensual homosexual sodomy is criminalized because it is immoral and
harmful; (2) the harm caused by investigating under-founded allegations of consensual homosexual
sodomy is, in the aggregate, more harmful to military effectiveness than the sodomy itself, and,
therefore, (3) it is prudent to retain Article 125, for expressive reasons and to punish indiscrete homosexual conduct, while prudentially determining not to investigate under-founded allegations. I
am unaware of anyone who has defended the coherence of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" with the retention of Article 125 in these terms, and there is no convincing evidence to suggest that any of the
legislators or policy makers involved in fashioning "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" had this in mind.
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would expect that commanders would be empowered to exercise their
customary authority to investigate such allegations in order to identify
and punish the offenders. 53 "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," however, severely
restricts a commander's investigative prerogatives 54 with respect to the
felony of consensual homosexual sodomy, 55 and to this felony alone. 56 In
fact, a commander is empowered to pursue suspected jaywalkers and litterers much more aggressively and proactively than those whom he suspects of engaging in consensual homosexual sodomy. 57 One would likewise expect that military authorities would be encouraged to cull
prospective recruits to ensure that they did not have a propensity to engage in felonious conduct. Again, however, unique rules apply to consensual homosexual sodomy, and the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime
expressly forbids such screening solely for this felony.58
As this brief summary makes apparent, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
simply papers over an enormous array of inconsistencies and incongruities involving the implementation and application of the military's policy toward homosexuals. More than this, it seeks to mask fundamental
philosophical differences concerning homosexuality itself, while failing
to even acknowledge its existence. It is as if competing proponents at a
city council meeting were urging that a newly installed traffic sign be
painted either red (to direct motorists to stop) or green (to advise them to
proceed), and their resolution was to mix red and green paint and color it
53. The MCM directs generally, "Upon receipt of information that a member of the command
is accused or suspected of committing an offense or offenses triable by court-martial, the immediate
commander shall make or cause to be made a preliminary inquiry into the charges or suspected offenses." MCM, supra note 45, at ch. Il, R.C.M. 303 (emphasis added). The commander can conduct the investigation personally, direct a member of his command to investigate and report to him,
or refer the matter to appropriate law enforcement officials. Id. The investigation itself may be informal and, depending on the circumstances, relatively cursory. Id. But in any case, the immediate
commander is obligated to ensure that all allegations are appropriately investigated. Id.
54. See DOD DIR. 1304.26, supra note 24, at E 1.2.8.1. "Applicants also will not be asked or
required to reveal whether they have engaged in homosexual conduct, unless independent evidence
is received indicating that an applicant engaged in such conduct or unless the applicant volunteers a
statement that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect." Id.
55. The military justice system does not distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors. The
maximum punishment for consensual sodomy under military law is a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for five years. MCM, supra note 45, at pt. IV,
51 e(4). In civilian systems, a felony is defined as being a "serious crime, usu[ally] punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year or by death." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 633 (7th ed. 1999).
56.

See SLDN, WHAT iS DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE, DON'T HARASS? (stating

that there are "[m]ore than a dozen specific investigative limits ... laid out in DoD instructions and
directives"), at http://www.sldn.org/templates/dont/record.html?section=42&record=749 (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
57. See id. at 4.
58. See DOD DIR. 1304.26, supra note 24, at El .2.8.1.
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brown. The compromise solution utterly fails to express any normative
judgment about the rightness or wisdom of stopping or going, nor does it
evince any principled rationale for the color that was chosen. The same
can seemingly be said for "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." In order to understand the policy and its ramifications more fully, it is necessary to appreciate the red and the green of it, i.e., the underlying moral debate.

III. THE MORAL DEBATE
Those on both sides of the moral divide relating to "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" oftentimes share at least one defining characteristicdisregard, if not contempt, for the opposing view. In some respects, this
reaction is the logical consequence of the moral certainty that these proponents have in their respective incompatible beliefs. But the vitriol and
enmity reflected in much of the discourse is nonetheless remarkable and
and it is an impediment to any practical progress or underunnecessary,
9
standing.5

59. For example, Pat Robertson is well known for his irrational and harsh statements about
homosexuality, such as: "Many of those people involved with Adolph Hitler were Satanists, many
of them were homosexuals-the two things seem to go together." Pat Robertson, THE 700 CLUB,
Jan. 21, 1993, at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7027/quotes.html. Mr. Robertson has also
stated: "If the widespread practice of homosexuality will bring about the destruction of your nation,
if it will bring about terrorist bombs, if it'll bring about earthquakes, tornadoes and possibly a meteor, it isn't necessarily something we ought to open our arms to." Pat Robertson, THE 700 CLUB,
June 8, 1998, at http://www.gainesvillehumanists.org/patr.htm. Jerry Falwell has purportedly said,
"[Homosexuals are] brute beasts ... part of a vile and satanic system [that] will be utterly annihilated, and there will be a celebration in heaven." JIM HILL & RAND CHEADLE, THE BIBLE TELLS ME
So 69-70 (1996).
Some pro-homosexual sources are equally vitriolic in characterizing those who disagree with them.
See e.g., Scott Bidstrup, Homophobia: The FearBehind the Hatred("[Heterosexual men] fear [homosexual men which] leads to a subconscious reaction: hate and/or kill the queer and you're not
like him, because you've distanced yourself from him. Irrational, isn't it? Yet that's the subconscious logic involved.") at http://www.bidstrup.com/phobia.htm (last revised Sept. 30, 2000); Fr. Ed
lngebretsen, ACC, Rainbow Sash Movement--Gay Catholic Activists at
(last visited Mar. 4, 2004);
http://www.rainbowsashmovement.org/Stocking%20hate.html
N. McLean, Letter to the Editor of Globe and Mail, Religious Tolerance.Org (posting a letter to an
editor which accuses the Catholic Church of engaging in a "witch hunt against homosexuals" and
compares the Church to the Nazi party), at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom fuel.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2004); World Pride Roma 2000 March (discussing a "huge banner" in the march
which said: "In Memory of All Those Homosexuals Persecuted and Killed by the Catholic
Church"), at
http://http://astroqueer.tripod.com/charts/rome.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2004). Some even go so far
as to characterize heterosexual men as brutes and homosexual men as being the prime repository of
intellect and humanity (the so-called "Homo Homo Sapiens"):
I suggest a prehistoric origin of... "the gay little brother effect" of the last members of a
large child-flock. The mothers [sic] hormonal warfare against the child in her womb was
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These proponents have something else in common-a considerable
philosophical tradition that supports their respective positions concerning homosexuality in general, and the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" approach
in particular. Because each side is so routinely dismissive of the other's
beliefs, it is worthwhile to pause, for a moment, to consider the magnitude, depth, and import of the clashing philosophies that are at play in
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" controversy.60
A. The TraditionalArguments Against Homosexuality
The Jewish and Christian traditions have for over two thousand
years, in a clear and sustained manner, judged homosexual behavior to
be morally wrong. 61 Although many Americans continue to hold this
Nature's way of birth control and means of installing female values intravenously in
stead [sic] of lecturing tin-eared males. Born was the care-bear, the purser, the servant,
the hairdresser, the pedagogue, the nurse, the scientist, the humanist, the Renaissance
Man, the creative man, the social adept ape, the social climber, the interior decorator.
Gone was the aggressive, the criminal, the muscle man, the psychopath, the wifebeater,
the absent father. The new kind of ape-man fits better into social hierarchies than aggressive males ....
I suggest that the cultural dominance of homosexual males in history (going back 48004900 years ago) dates back to the emergence of culture, in fact it is human civilization.
And culture is the missing link between man and apes, as man is a cultural chimp, no
more, no less. The "cultural revolution" in the last 30,000 years is unexplained as the
fossil reflection of this is missing. A gay source for this is close at hand as they were responsible for all other revolutions of civilization. The first evolutionary consequental
[sic] use of tools was the beginning of culture and man alike. It was the whole-brained
approach of gay manapes that was the driving force behind all cultural development
from 5,000,000 B.C. till now. Not only 5,000 years of history or the 100 years of social
constructivists. The evolutionary balance sheet with non-reproducing gays does not add
up, so the missing link had to be found. Take out the gay contribution to all kinds of culture in historic times and we would still live in caves. We would have little culture,
hardly any science, and no democracy, the Greek contribution can be stricken, as would
be the Renaissance, Humanism and the Enlightenment.
Jim McKnight, Origin of "'Homo," at http://users.cybercity.dk/--dkol2530/qstudies.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2004). Indeed, even one of my roundtable co-panelists disparagingly commented that during
our discussion, "I sometimes think the most dangerous man on the planet is a white, male, Protestant Army Colonel, who was an Eagle Scout when young." Also, one questioner was rendered
"speechless" and was "terrified" that military chaplains played a role in the implementation of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell." See also Homosexual Leader Vows to "Torture" Opponents, World Net
Daily (April 30, 2004) at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=38275 (indicating that Matt Foreman, executive director of the National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, declared his intent to seek "retribution against 'local legislators and leaders' who oppose the homosexual agenda .. ")
60. For religious, philosophical and practical reasons, I am firmly in the natural
law/traditional camp. My personal position and beliefs, however, are unimportant to the basic thesis
of this article, which could be offered by someone holding diametrically opposed views.
61. For a comprehensive survey of the ancient roots of the proscription against sodomy, see
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same belief because of moral principles derived from religious convictions and teachings, many also take the same position based, in whole or
in part, on reasoned arguments premised on the natural law or other
sources that can stand independent of revealed truth or theological
dogma. 62 It is primarily these traditional philosophical objections to homosexuality, rather than theological or religious demurrals, that are
summarized here.
Of course, any historical review of the law as it relates to sodomy
necessarily includes the consideration of religious sources. The Bible itself repeatedly and consistently refers to homosexuality and homosexual
acts as being immoral and sinful. 63 By the fourth century A.D. the Roman Empire had formally adopted the Christian faith as its official state
religion, 64 thereby incorporating the received theological and revelational tradition of the Old and New Testaments. 65 The English Common
Yao Apasu-Gbotsu etal., Survey on the ConstitutionalRight to PrivacyIn the Context of HomosexualActivity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525-26 (1985). John Boswell has taken issue with this premise, contending that early Christians were not hostile or disapproving of homosexuality. JOHN
BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN
EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1980).

Others have convincingly criticized Boswell's historical reconstruction. See e.g., Richard B. Hays,
Relations Natural and Unnatural: A Response to John Boswell's Exegesis of Romans 1, 14 J.
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 184, 202-04 (1986).

62. The inter-relationship between the natural law and religion is complex. In one sense, the
natural law holds that morality is knowable by reason alone, as human reason can identify that
which is in accord with nature without resort to any divine revelation. On the other hand, every law
presupposes a lawgiver, and thus the "natural law makes no sense.., without God as its author."
CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW 30 (1993). This section focuses on the
philosophical, rather than primarily religious, objections to homosexuality.
63. See, e.g., I Corinthians 6:10 ("neither fornicators, idolaters or adulterers, nor sodomites ... will inherit God's kingdom"); Genesis 19:1-29 (destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah);
Leviticus 19:22 ("You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; such a thing is an abomination.");
Romans 1:24-27 ("Men did shameful things with men and thus received in their own persons the
penalty for their perversity."); I Timothy 1:10 (stating the lawless include fornicators and sodomites). See also Catholic Study Bible: New American Bible (Donald Senior, gen. ed. 1990).
64. In the Edict of Milan, 313 A.D., the Emperor Constantine, then a recent convert to Christianity, declared that Christians "were free to worship as they pleased, and they would not be required to participate in the rites of the state cult." See JO-ANN SHELTON, AS THE ROMANS DID: A
SOURCEBOOK IN ROMAN SOCIAL HISTORY 416 (1998); see also NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A

HISTORY 209 (1996). Later, Theodosius the Great (346 A.D. - 395 A.D.) enacted laws that effectively recognized the Christian faith as the official state religion of the Roman Empire. See Theodosius 1,THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 1055-56 (N.G.L. Hammond & H.H. Scullard eds., 2d
ed. 1970).
65. Homosexual sodomy was declared a crime by the Emperor Theodosius of the Roman
Empire, THEODOSIUS, THE THEODOSIAN CODE 9.7.6 (Clyde Pharr, trans., Greenwood Press 1969).
Emperor Justinian also declared homosexual sodomy to be a crime. JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN 291 (William Grapel, Esq., trans., Win. W. Grant & Sons, Inc., 1994) (1855). Justinian
had codified the earlier lex Julia de adulteries, which punished adultery and "unmentionable crimes
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Law tradition, which has had a singularly important impact upon American jurisprudence, 66 was in turn influenced by Roman law. 67 The English
Common Law continued to describe sodomy in the most disapproving
terms,68 with Blackstone calling it "the infamous crime against nature"
and "a crime not fit to be named., 69 The English legal tradition, includcame to North America with the settling of
ing its laws against sodomy,
70
the Thirteen Colonies.
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by
the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights.
In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the
37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961,
all 50 States outlawed sodomy .... 71
Homosexual rights advocates, based on this historical record, sometimes mistakenly assert that the opposition to homosexual conduct is
purely a byproduct of Christianity, 72 and that secular moralists in ancient
Greece and Rome had a much more "enlightened" acceptance of homosexual conduct.7 3 Notwithstanding a general acquiescence toward homoof lust." Id. This codification coincides with Christian teaching about homosexuality.
66.

See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.01 (1995). "American

criminal law is primarily English in its heritage and judicial in its origin. In large measure, the original thirteen American states and most later states adopted English law as their own." Id.
h
67. Henricus De Bracton, in his mid- 13" Century treatise entitled On the Laws and Customs
of England, was the first commentator to produce a comprehensive study of the English Common
Law. See 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard University Press 1968). Bracton was so influenced by the English common law that it seems he
even patterned his scholarship after the Roman Institutes of Gaius and Justinian. 2 SIR JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 199 (London, Macmillian &

Co. 1883). And, natural law ideas were repeatedly expressed by Sir Edward Coke and Blackstone,
among others, in the common law. RICE, supra note 62, at 36-38.
68. See generally supra note 50, discussing whether sodomy was an offense under English
common law.
69. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at 215-16.
70. "The common law of England, including its prohibition of sodomy, became the received
law of... the... Colonies." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring), overruledby Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
71. Id. at 192-93. A majority of the Supreme Court in Lawrence criticized Bowers' historical
review of sodomy and the law. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80 ("Their [the majority in Bowers]
historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.").
72. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies,80 VA. L. REV. 1515 (1994).
73. It is true that Hellenistic culture did tend to be generally accepting of homosexuality. For
example, the Thebians created a military unit entirely composed of homosexual lovers. I
PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 396 (John Dryden trans., Arthur
Hugh Clough ed., Modem Library 1992). One of the causes of the Maccabees rebellion of the Jews
against Hellenistic rule was the officially introduced practice involving the seduction of Jewish
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sexuality among cosmopolitan Greek society, such conduct was condemned as immoral by the three great philosophers of the pagan westAristotle, Plato and Socratesa-as well as by other early and prominent
secular writers. 75 Moreover, pre-Christian Roman law, while not proscribing homosexuality in its entirety, clearly disapproved of homosexual conduct, and in particular it punished the homosexual seduction of
youth.76
This general antipathy toward homosexuality during the last two
millennia has not always been well articulated, perhaps because to do so
was largely unnecessary given the general agreement over time that homosexuality is fundamentally wrong. Contributing to this cultural consensus was the common perception of homosexual conduct as being aesthetically unpleasant or worse.77 Aesthetics is arguably a largely
personal and subjective matter, however, and that which is subjectively
displeasing is not necessarily immoral. 8
youths to engage in homosexual acts in the Gymnasium.
When Jason received the king's approval and came into office, he immediately initiated
his countrymen into the Greek way of life ... he abrogated the lawful institutions and introduced customs contrary to the law. He quickly established a gymnasium at the very
foot of the acropolis, where he induced the noblest young men to wear a Greek hat.
2 Maccabees 4:10-13.
74. Socrates, as portrayed by both Plato and Xenophon, unequivocally condemned homosexual copulation. See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation,"69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1049, 1055-57 (1994). Plato likewise was clear "that all forms of sexual conduct outside heterosexual marriage are shameful, wrongful, and harmful." Id. at 1057. In The Laws, Plato describes
homosexual intercourse as an "unnatural" crime and compares it to incest. Id. at 1057 n.17. Aristotle
was also disapproving of homosexuality, concluding that homosexuality is an indulgence in pleasure that is contrary to human good. IX ARISTOTLE, EThICA NICOMACHEA (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford University Press 1963). Professor Nussbaum instead argues that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
never disapproved of homosexual conduct per se. See Nussbaum, supra note 72, at 1555-97. However, the sources upon which she most relies (A.W. PRICE, LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO AND
ARISTOTLE (1989) and KENNETH J. DOVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY (1990)), seem to hold other-

wise. See Finnis, supraat 1055-63.
75. For example, the great Roman historian Plutarch condemns homosexual intercourse as
well as masturbation in his Erotikos. See Finnis, supra note 74, at 1062 n.33, 1062-63.
76. II THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 784, 806 (Alan Watson trans., University of Pennsylvania
Press 1998).
77. As noted earlier, Blackstone described homosexuality as "a crime against nature" and "a
crime not fit to be named." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at 215-16. Blackstone was able to describe certain infamous crimes in detail-such as murder, theft, and rape-but homosexual acts
were so repugnant to him and his contemporaries that he would not do the same for these.
I will not act so disagreeable part, to my readers as well as myself, as to dwell any longer
upon a subject, the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature. It will be more
eligible to imitate in this respect the delicacy of our English law, which treats it, in it's
very indictments, as a crime not fit to be named.
Id.
78. The relationship between aesthetics and ethics is quite complex and controversial. While
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The more serious commonly held objection to homosexuality is that
it involves using the sex organs in an unnatural manner, i.e., contrary to
their design and purpose. Put simply, males were not "made" to have sex
with males, and females were not "made" to have sex with females, and
from this self-evident premise it follows that what is biologically discordant is therefore morally wrong. Although this syllogism is certainly
consistent with some traditional natural law objections to homosexuality,
the natural law approach is more sophisticated and nuanced, and it rests
upon an impressive and venerable intellectual tradition.
1. The Natural Law and Homosexuality
The dominant traditional natural law theory is rooted in the moral
and metaphysical philosophy of Aristotle, which culminated in the work
of St. Thomas Aquinas. 79 Aristotle held that all things have a natural end
or purpose (telos), the satisfaction of which is virtuous.80 For example, a
good sword is virtuous if it is a proficient weapon. Similarly, the "good"
person is one who fulfills the end, goal, or purpose of a human life. It is
distinctively human to be rational, and thus the end or purpose of a human life is to be "maximal rational," i.e., living in harmony with all the
basic needs and inclinations of our nature and restraining the often conflicting excesses of bodily cravings and emotional longings by way of a
rational ordering to the good of the whole individual.81
The natural law views each person as having a rational nature that
determines his or her fulfillment, 82 and it is this capacity for rational
thought and action that distinguishes human beings from irrational creatures or things. 83 Virtue is the habit of choosing what is rational in terms
of a mean or equilibrium, relative to the individual person, between exmodem philosophers tend to view beauty as wholly subjective and nominal, the classical and premodem philosophers find beauty to be a real thing-a form in the world as real as numbers. The
Thomistic tradition believes in the unity of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, which means that
what is true is both good and beautiful. Similarly, Hans Urs von Balthasar argued that beauty
("splendor") is a transcendental property that can be found in all things. I HANS URS VON
BALTHASAR, THE GLORY OF THE LORD 34-45 (1982). A more detailed discussion of aesthetics and
ethics is beyond the scope of this article.
79. See generally LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987) (discussing the

origins and branches of natural law theory).
80. See IX ARISTOTLE, supra note 74, at Book 1, 1094aI.
81. Id. at Book 1, 1098a.

82. All things have a function or activity proper to its being, and their fulfillment or perfection
is realized in carrying out that activity. In man, that activity is the exercising of and being obedient
to the rational principle. Id.
83.

Id.
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tremes and excesses of desires.84 A virtuous person is one who chooses
to express maximally the mean among all desires. 85 This is what Aristotle called "eudiamonia," which is typically translated as "happiness. 8 6
This "happiness" refers to more than a psychological state; it means having a truly fulfilled or virtuous life.87
Human laws result from practical reason as it moves from the natural law to particular applications, providing training to perfect one's
natural aptitudes for virtue. The law, in other words, can help to cultivate
good habits, and accordingly, the promulgators of human law should intend to encourage virtue.88 Lawmakers should also seek to discourage
vice through fear, which in contemporary terms is known as deterrence.
The law, by holding human audacity in check, helps to maintain order
and promote the common good. Human laws are seen as legitimate only
when they are in accord with justice, and "a law that is unjust seems like
no law at all."8 9
The most obvious and basic of the human goods are those that we
share with all creatures and things, i.e., self-preservation and selfdefense. 90 Other human goods are evident given the objective content of
84. Id. at Book 2, 1106a-1 107b.
85. Id. atBook2, 1109b.
86. The Nichomachean Approach to Ethics: The Argument of Ethics I and H (reviewing IX
ARISTOTLE, supra note 74), at
http://www.molloy.edu/academic/philosophy/sophia/aristote/Aristotle-Ethics 1-2_commentary.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
87. According to Aristotle, an incomplete life cannot be judged happy because happiness is
only fully known after a person has died. Happiness, in other words, cannot be judged before the
fact. See, e.g., FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE DIVINE GOOD: MODERN MORAL THEORY AND THE
NECESSITY OF GOD 27 (1990).

88. Of course, the law is not the only mechanism in society that influences human action.
Other institutions, such as the family, church, and societal norms, may be more effective in regulating human conduct than the law. Indeed, the law must necessarily prohibit only those things that are
most gravely wrong, such as murder and theft. Although the law may theoretically "command every
virtue and prohibit every vice," prudence counsels that laws should be made only if they are effective in leading the people to virtue. See THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 207 (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province, trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952).
89. Id. at 227 (quoting Augustine, De lib. Arb. i, 5).
90. According to Aquinas, self-preservation and self-defense are the most basic inclinations to
the good under the natural law, as these are in accordance with that "which [one] has in common
with all substances." AQUINAS, supra note 88, at 222. For Aristotle, knowledge comes from the
senses. Sense perception provides a basis from which the mind can abstract the essential nature of
the individual appearances that the senses encounter. The abstract essential nature is universal in the
sense that it is something one predicates of many individuals. The unity of nature is also a feature of
our abstract knowing. It is something we conceive over and against the individuals we perceive.
This is not to say that universals are merely mental constructs, but rather that what individuates individuals is excluded through abstraction. Being can be studied qua being through abstraction by
seeking the most general and universal terms that predicate being. And thus in the Categories,sub-
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human nature, 91 such as knowledge, friendship, and the care and education of offspring. 92 Sexual intercourse is likewise an objective human
good.93 Reason directs people toward these human goods through virtuous activities that are both proper to the individual and shared in common with other rational beings.94
Temperance is the virtue of rightly ordering the physical goods and
appetites of a person according to reason. 95 Animals instinctually fulfill
their needs with regard to these physical goods, but people are instead
generally guided by reason rather than instinct. This is what it means to
be a rational being--one can choose to be virtuous and act temperately,
or choose to act intemperately by using physical goods in an unreasonable or "disordered" fashion, such as in a manner that is excessive in
amount or discordant with purpose. 96 For example, for most people eating two large pizzas would be unreasonable (and thus objectively
wrong), not only because of the self-inflicted discomfort or pain caused
by such over-eating, but also because the action is inconsistent with the
end for which eating is ordered, i.e., good health and nutrition. Choosing
to eat dirt or sand would likewise be objectively wrong because it is disordered to the end of eating. A well-formed person desires what is reasonable because it is reasonable, and not because he fears the law.
Human reason is of course not infallible; it can fail regarding the
things that a person should do.97 This usually involves the obfuscation of
reason by a bad disposition of the appetites and desires. 98 Virtuous habits
help keep one's appetites in accord with reason, and bad habits can lead
to unreasonable choices. 99 Although acting in accord with reason reinforces right habits, virtue can also be enhanced and promoted through
stance is said to be of two kinds, individual substance and universal substance. See, e.g., JONATHAN
LEAR, ARISTOTLE: THE DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND 1-26 (1988); see also RALPH MCINERNY, A FIRST
GLANCE AT ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A HANDBOOK FOR PEEPING THOMISTS IX (1990) (discussing

Thomism's basic assumption on knowledge through the senses).
91. The first principles of any science must be known in some way to be true without proof,
as they would otherwise be required to prove themselves. Either nothing is known to be true or
something must be known to be true without proof. ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 5-7 (Jonathan Barnes trans., Clarendon Press 1975).
92. AQUINAS, supranote 88, at 222.
93. Id.
94. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 74, at Book 1I, 1105a-l 106a.
95. AQUINAS, supra note 88, at 223. The natural bodily appetites regulated by temperance
include the natural desire for food, drink, and sexual intercourse.
96. Id.
97. Although the first principle "do good and avoid its contrary" is known by many, disordered passions can impede the application of this first principle to particular actions.
98. IX ARISTOTLE, supra note 74, at Book It, 11 14a-l 11 5a.
99. Id.
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external mechanisms, such as parents, teachers and, as noted earlier, the
law.100 Ultimately, one acts virtuously not out of fear of others or -the
law, but from an understanding of and appreciation for the reasonableness of the act itself. In other words, a person acts virtuously because he
takes pleasure in doing so, just as he is pained by acting contrary to what
is objectively good.' 0' Eating dirt or sand is unreasonable regardless of
whether the law prohibits this, and regardless of whether a person desires to do so. Further, a law requiring the eating of dirt or sand would be
considered illegitimate and thus no law at all.
According to this view, the expression of human sexuality through
acts, as the product of a rational human choice, thus may be reasonable
(or unreasonable) as judged in light of immutable human nature. Some
misunderstand the natural law as holding that that which occurs in nature
10 2
is by definition "natural," and it therefore must be objectively moral.
Although nature can serve as a useful guide for human action, reason requires that people order their sexual desires in light of the self-evident
end of sexual congress, i.e., the procreation of new life and the continuation of the human species,103 and not for some other unreasonable purpose. 10 4 Sexual congress between persons of the same sex is thus objectively unreasonable because it is discordant with right reason and human
nature. 10 5 As the law is intended to lead citizens to virtue, while at the
100. See discussion supra Part III. A.
101. Like speech, virtuous habits are most easily developed in the young (prior to the formation of disordered habits).
102. Numerous writers have criticized the "natural law" prohibition of homosexual sex on the
grounds that other animals have homosexual sex, and therefore homosexuality is "natural." See,
e.g., Susan McCarthy, The Fabulous Kingdom of Gay Animals, SALON IVORY TOWER, March 15,
1999, at http://www.salon.com/it/feature/1999/03/covI 5featurea.html. Though some animals may
sometimes instinctually fulfill their sexual appetites through homosexual activity, this does not
make it reasonable for humans to do the same. That apes and other creatures sometimes assault or
take the property of another creature does not necessarily imply that such actions are accord with
correct reasoning for human beings. Particularly, it would certainly be unreasonable to accept the
animal kingdom as a guide for the reasonableness of human sexuality; although it may be reasonable for the mantis to eat her mate in the throws of passion, this is not particularly instructive for
human conduct even though it is "natural" in the sense that it occurs in nature.
103. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Second Part of the Second Part, Q. 153,
art. 2 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., Benzinger Bros. ed. 1947), available at
http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/SS/SS I53.html.
104. Id. at http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/SS/SS 153.html. The sexual act is intrinsically
procreative and reproductive. Under this rule, however, it would be objectively unreasonable for
spouses who are temporarily or permanently unable to generate human life to engage in sexual intercourse, since such an act is intrinsically oriented toward procreation.
105. An explicit intent to procreate is not necessary at the time of sexual union, as long a general habit to have sex for procreation is present. See id. at
http:www.ccel.org/a/Aquinas/summa/SS/SS153.html. Sexual intercourse also has a secondary pur-
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same time discouraging vice, lawmakers can justly criminalize purely
personal vice, such as homosexual acts, even in the absence of direct social harm, and even though the law is primarily concerned with the
common good of society. Further, a law that is discordant with justice by
encouraging vice would be illegitimate.
2. "The New Natural Law" 10 6 and Homosexuality
When most people speak of natural law, they have in mind the traditional understanding that "morality can be derived from human nature."' 0 7 This understanding implies that moral virtues are discoverable
through human reason and actions are reasonable in light of our human
nature. 10 8 The "new natural law" theorists approach the concept of objective morality in a different way. 10 9 These theorists argue that the traditional natural law adherents have committed the "naturalistic fallacy"' "10
of presuming that moral propositions can be derived from factual propositions about human nature."'i These "new natural law" theorists instead
use the concept of self-evident "basic goods" as a touchstone for objective moral norms. "12

pose, the strengthening of the marital bond of love affection between married persons. The natural
law tradition views this secondary purpose as mutually supportive of the primary purpose of sexual
intercourse, which is the birth and raising of children.
106. The metaphysical foundations of the natural law have been undermined in contemporary
society because modem science has replaced Aristotelian teleology with a materialist worldview
that considers only efficient causes. See ANTHONY J. LiSSKA, AQUtNAS'S THEORY OF NATURALISM:
AN ANALYTIC RECONSTRUCTION 52 (1996). The goal of the "new natural law," rather than appeal-

ing directly to metaphysical claims that were rejected by the Enlightenment, is to work within the
Kantian limits of human knowledge. Id. at 57-58. The "new natural law," in other words, establishes
that "moral property, cannot be defined analytically by reference to a natural property." Id. at 61-62.
The most prominent "new natural law" philosophers include John Finnis, Germaine Grisez and Joseph Boyle.
107. David Gordon, New But Not Improved, THE MISES REV. (1999) (reviewing ROBERT P.
GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (1999)), at
http://www.mises.org/misesreviewdetail.asp?control= 129&sortorder-issue.
108. Id.
109. Id. (noting that "new natural law" theorists reject the old concept of natural law).
110. See LISSKA, supra note 106, at 59 (stating that traditional law adherents, such as Moore,
suggest that Mill has committed the naturalistic fallacy).
111. See id. St. Thomas would reply to this assertion that one cannot derive an "ought" from an
"is" by arguing that moral judgments arise from understanding the relation between the real good of
man that corresponds to his being and a particular action. See AQUINAS, supra note 88, at 246-47.
112. Gordon, supranote 107, at
http://www.mises.org/misesreviewdetail.asp?control=129&sortorder-issue (noting that "[t]he basic goods.., are incommensurable ....The answer lies in the fundamental principle of morality,
which is never to act directly against a basic good").
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"Basic goods" include life, health, marriage, religion, play, and
knowledge.' 13 These goods are self-evident first principles, which are
derived not from any factual understanding of human nature, but instead
are manifestly known.1 14 They alone provide the rational grounds for
human activity, and thus any action directed toward some other end is,
by definition, objectively irrational.' 5 For example, because pleasure is
not one of the "basic goods," ' 1 6 it would be irrational to engage in an activity solely because it gives pleasure.1 7 The "new natural law" thus expresses the moral imperative in the negative-one
should not act in a
' 18
way that compromises or hinders a "basic good." "
According to the "new natural law," homosexual activity is objectively wrong because it damages "integral human fulfillment."'" 9 "All
who accept that homosexual acts can be a humanly appropriate use of
sexual capacities must, if consistent, regard sexual capacities, [their sexual] organs and acts as instruments for gratifying the individual 'selves'
who have them."' 12 In other words, participants in homosexual acts necessarily mistreat "their one personal reality," i.e., their bodies, by misus-

113. See id; see also Robert P. George & Gerald V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L. J. 301,307 (1995).
114. George & Bradley, supra note 113, at 307.
115. Gordon states:
These goods serve as rational grounds for action. If you act for some ultimate end that is
not on [a "new natural law" theoristi's "A" list then you are irrational. If, say, you do
something just because it .gives you pleasure, you have no ground in reason for your act.
Gordon, supra note 107, at
http://www.mises,org/misesreviewdetail.asp?control = I29&sortorder-issue.
116. JoHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 95-97 (1980) (arguing that the experience of pleasure is not a basic good, although it may make us want to do or participate in a basic
good).
117. Similarly, no "other real or imagined internal feeling" based on experiences "such as
'pleasure', or 'peace of mind', or 'freedom' ... or sets of experiences such as 'happiness,"' can
constitute a basic good or value. Id, at 95.
118. See Finnis, supra note 74, at 1068-69. Because the "basic goods" are incommensurable, it
is difficult to conceive how one should act when they conflict.
119. As explained by George and Bradley,
The body, as part of the personal reality of the human being, may not be treated as a
mere instrument without damaging the integrity of the acting person as a dynamic unity
of body, mind, and spirit. To treat one's own body, or the body of another as a pleasureinducing machine ... is to alienate one part of the self, namely, one's consciously experiencing... self, from another, namely, one's bodily self.... [This] disintegrates the
acting persona as such.... In reality, whatever the generous hopes and dreams and
thoughts of giving with which some same-sex partners may surround their sexual acts,
those acts cannot express or do more than is expressed or done if two strangers engage in
such activity ....
George & Bradley, supranote 113, at 314 (quoting Finnis, supra note 74, at 1067).
120. Finnis, supra note 74, at 1070.
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ing them as an instrumental means to some partial and ultimately unsatisfying end, i.e., pleasure. 12 1 This misuse of the body harms the participants of homosexual sex by damaging their personal integrity; as all sex
that is undertaken solely for the sake of pleasure is wrong. 2 2 Only sexual intercourse between spouses has, as its purpose, an object that does
not alienate the person as bodily and intellectual agent. 23 In marriage,
"this bodily unity is not extrinsic to [the spouses'] emotional and spiritual unity,"'12 4 and thus marital congress "actualizes the multi-leveled
communion" intrinsic to marriage, which is itself a basic
personal
25
good.

1

B. The Latitudinarian126 Arguments in Favor of Homosexuality
Much of modem philosophy, and modern biology for that matter,
challenges the Aristotelian conception of metaphysics (i.e., hylomorphic
metaphysics), and especially the Thomistic formulation of Aristotelian
metaphysics.'2 7 This is related to the story of the rise of Protestantism

121. Id. at 1069, 1070.
122. Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be. Self-Alienation, Illusion or One-Flesh
Union, 42 AM. J.JURIS. 135, 138-39 (1997).
123. Id. at 145.
124. Id. at 144.
125. Id. Other variants of the natural law objection to homosexuality have been made. For example, Michael Pakaluk begins with the proposition that sexual intercourse has a special status,
which is reflected, for example, in the different treatment of rape as compared to other assaults. Sex
is special because it is a natural sign of the union of the persons who engage in it. It has two distinctive characters: a reciprocal unitive character (i.e., a real physical union involving the "containment
of the woman and man" via their reproductive organs), and a reproductive character. Homosexual
sex is lacking in both of these components. Michael Pakaluk, Presentation, Why is Homosexual Activity Morally Wrong?, in HOMOSEXUALITY: CHALLENGES FOR CHANGE AND REORIENTATION, J.

PASTORAL COUNSELING 53-56 (1993). Pakaluk's thinking has been criticized by Gregory Baum,
who argues that the meaning of sexuality cannot be defined apart from culture and historical experience. Gregory Baum, Homosexuality and the Natural Law, I THE ECUMENIST 33, 34 (Jan.-Feb.
1994). The criticism by Baum of Pakaluk and like thinkers is generally inseparable from a broader
critique of natural law theory.
There are other philosophical approaches that find homosexual activity to be immoral and inherently damaging to the human person, including philosophical personalism, which reaches similar
conclusions as the natural law, by focusing on the dignity of the human person. See generally Janet
E. Smith, NaturalLaw and Personalism in Veritatis Splendor,at
http://www.aodonline.org/aodonlinesqlmages/SHMS/Faculty/SmithJanetlPublications/MoraPhiloso
phy/NaturalLawandPersonalism.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
126. Latitudinarian as an adjective characterizes a person or position of latitude in moral matters. Originally applied in the 17 th through 19"' centuries, it has now taken on a broader meaning of
"holding or expressing broad or tolerant views." See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed.
2000), available at http://www.bartleby.coni/61/49/L0064900.html.
127. See MCINERNY, supra note 90, at 32-35.
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and modem philosophy. Martin Luther was trained in the teachings of
William of Ockham and other nominalism.128 Against the Thomistic/Aristotelian belief in essential natures knowable by the human mind,
instead the nominalists believed that universals have no metaphysical
status. 129 The ability of the mind to apprehend the divine Being through
abstraction from individual instances of being is entirely illusory to
nominalists.130 Will takes priority over intellect in ethical thought because the intellect is no longer held to have access to the authentically
132
31
real as it is for Thomists.1 This is the position known as voluntarism.

Thus, the sciences of philosophy, and especially metaphysics, as they
were known were completely divided from theology.1 33 Philosophical
speculation about the nature of God was viewed as fruitless. No rational
inquiry into the nature of the divine Being could be derived through the
134
Revelation is, therefore, the only
senses or through natural reason.
135
God.
about
knowledge
of
source
Immanuel Kant would later make a similar claim as the nominalists, arguing that all previous metaphysics had not accounted for the
roles that such innate concepts play in forming knowledge and in limiting the legitimate scope of knowledge. 136 Because the conceptual struc128. See J.B. SCHNEEDWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 17-36 (1998).
129. See generally M. DE WULF, Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism, in CAT1-OLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA (K. Knight ed. 2003) (191 1)(explaining how the universals do not exist in nature
and have no presence outside of the mind), available at
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/1l090c.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
130. See SHARON M. KAYE & ROBERT M. MARTIN, ON OCKHAM 10-12 (2001).
131.

See, e.g., SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P., THE SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 331 (Sr. Mary

Thomas Noble, O.P. trans., The Catholic University Press 3d ed. 1995).
132. See Leslie J. Walker, Voluntarism, in CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (K. Knight ed. 2003)
(1912), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen 15505a. htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
133. SeePINCKAERS, supranote 131, at 191, 193-94.
134. See id. at 345-46.
135. See SCHNEEDWIND, supra note 128, at 30-31.
136. This is Kant's famous "Copernican revolution." See generally IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J. M. D. Meiklejohn trans., Prometheus Books 1990); IMMANUEL
KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS THAT WILL BE ABLE TO PRESENT ITSELF AS

A SCIENCE 27-28 (Peter G. Lucas trans., Manchester Univ. Press 1966). Anthony Kenny explains
Kant's revolution in philosophy as follows:
To become scientific, Kant believed, philosophy needed a revolution similar to that by
which Copernicus placed the sun, rather than the earth, at the centre of the system of the
heavens. Copernicus showed that when we think we are observing the motion of the sun
round the earth, what we see is in fact the consequence of the rotation of our own earth.
Kant's Copernican revolution will do for the mind what Copernicus did for the sense of
vision. Instead of asking how our knowledge can conform to its objects, we must start
from the supposition that objects must conform to our knowledge. Only thus can we justify the claim of metaphysics to a priori knowledge, which unlike a posteriori knowl-
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tures that underlie knowledge are those used for common discourse
about substances, causation, and events, they are relevant only when applied to the common phenomena of experience.' 37 Although metaphysics
seeks knowledge of the being of things-in-themselves (noumena) and
especially non-material being,138 the conceptual structures of representa139
tion, however, do not provide the conditions for such knowledge.
Therefore, since the conditions for knowledge are not satisfied with respect to the subject matter of metaphysics, Kant denies that there can be
any genuinely scientific knowledge of things in themselves. 40 In place
of such metaphysical speculation, Kant provided a prescriptive proposal
for critical metaphysics that could properly be called a science.' 41
Whereas traditional metaphysics was "transcendental" in the sense that it
sought knowledge of a reality that transcends experience, 42 Kant proposed a science of metaphysics that would seek to identify the most general feature of our thought and representations,
and the relations among
43
knowledge.1
of
presuppositions
and
concepts
edge comes before experience. All our knowledge begins with experience, but Kant insists that it does not follow that all of it arises from experience.
ANTHONY KENNY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 253 (1998).

137. Where knowledge is defined as "[flamiliarity, awareness, or understanding gained
through experience or study." AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 768 (4th ed. 2002).
138. IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS, supra note 136, at 15.
139. Seeid. at37.
140. As Kenny explains:
Kant observes that philosophers make a distinction between phenomena (appearances)
and noumena (objects of thought), and divide the world into a world of the senses and a
world of the understanding. His own analytic has shown that there cannot be a world of
mere appearances, mere objects of sense which do not fall under any categories or instantiate any rules. But we cannot conclude from this that there is a non-sensible world
which is discovered by the understanding alone. Kant accepts that there are noumena in a
negative sense: things which are not objects of sensible awareness. But he denies that
there are noumena in the positive sense: things which are objects of a non-sensible
awareness. The concept of noumenon, rightly understood, is simply a limiting concept,
whose function is to set the limits of sensibility. To accept the existence of noumena as
extrasensible objects which can be studied by the use of intellect alone is to enter a realm
of illusion. In his 'transcendental dialectic' Kant takes us on an exploratory tour of this
world of enchantment.
KENNY, supra note 136, at 262.
141.

See GAMWELL,supra note 87.

142. See Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudenceand the Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD.
L. REV. 506, 530 (2001).
143. Charles Darwin further complicates the matter, since evolutionary theory puts all things in
a process of random change. Some would argue that it makes no sense, from the Darwinian perspective, to talk about the ends and purposes of life, as there is no enduring and comprehensive conception of human nature. See generally LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY

AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 249-75 (1985). A more detailed and thorough discussion of the philosophical
underpinnings of the latitudinarian approach, or for that matter the traditional/natural law approach,
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At the end of the day, most "enlightenment philosophers" argue
from the premise of an egocentric individualism, which presupposes that
each person is free to establish his own truth based on whatever he finds
pleasing or useful, employing nothing but his own reason. 44 Truth is no
longer objective; 45 it is instead discerned by each person from the perspective of his unique point of view. 146 Truth (and virtue, or morality)
are thus situational, and can rightly depend on culture, experience, and
other relevant circumstances. 147 Freedom is seen as emancipation from
all of the conditions and traditions that prevent each person from followfor a good that reaing his own reason; it is no longer seen as a striving
48
son helps to uncover with reference to tradition.
The numerous contemporary arguments put forth in support of the
proposition that homosexuality is not immoral, and those who are
"openly" homosexual should not be prohibited from serving in the military, have, in one sense or another, sprung from these philosophical
sources. Although the specific contentions are diverse and eclectic, 149 a
few common threads have emerged to which most homosexual proponents subscribe. 150 The three most widely held and serious arguments
are: 1) the state should only proscribe those actions that objectively harm
others, and homosexuality (both generally and in the ranks) is not objectively harmful;' 5' 2) individual rights, including a right to engage in homosexual sex, must be recognized and protected in the context of military service; 52 and 3) the military is not significantly separate from the
is beyond the scope of this article.
144. See Tawia Ansah, Surprised by Sin. Human Rights and Universality, 30 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L. L. & COM. 307, 309 & n.7 (2003).
145. See Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964,974 (1978).
146. See id
147. See id.
148. PINCKAERS, supra note 131, at 340-41.
149. Compare John H.R. Lanou, RestrictedExpression and Immunosuppression: How "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" May Harm Military Readiness by Increasing the Risk of Cancer and Infectious
Disease in Homosexuals, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing for an approach with a utilitarian focus), with Alafair S.R. Burke, A Few Straight Men: Homosexuals in the Military and Equal
Protection, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 109, 110 (1994) (examining the policy under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment). A good listing of many of the contemporary approaches
taken by homosexual rights advocates, with responses to them, may be found in JOHN F. HARVEY,
THE TRUTH ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY (1996).
150. These positions are not necessarily exclusive of each other and, in fact, they often share
adherents. They are prescinded here, however, to show their logical distinction from each other.
151. See Ira P. Robbins, Gorecki: A Theory of Criminal Justice, 94 HARV. L. REv. 918, 925
(1981) (book review).
152. See Richard B. Sapphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of
CleburneLiving Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591,625-26 (2000).
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on homosexual orientation
rest of society, and thus discrimination 1based
53
or acts cannot be justified on this basis.
The first argument-that the state should only proscribe actions that
objectively harm others-is directly traceable to the 1957 Wolfenden
Report' 54 and the Mill/Stephens debate that presaged it.' 55 John Stewart
Mill argued that all crimes require a victim.' 56 Although Mill allowed for
some moral restraints, his central thesis was that the only justification of
criminal law is to prevent activities that harm others, such as murder,
theft, and battery.157 Some homosexual advocates, consistent with Mill's
approach, assert that the basis for punishing homosexuality, which is
founded only on unconvincing historical and moral concerns, 5 8 is inva153.

See id. at 619-20, 620 n.133.

154.

See THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES

AND PROSTITUTION (1963). The Wolfenden Report of 1957 ignited one of the most celebrated jurisprudential debates of the 20th century between H. L. A. Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin. See generally
LORD PATRICK DEVLtN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (discussing

Devlin's principle contention); H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (Stanford Univ. Press
1963) (discussing Hart's chief salvo).
155. This thinking can be traced to John Stuart Mill, who wrote ON LIBERTY in 1859, and soon
thereafter engaged in a lively debate with Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. This exchange prefigured
the famous Hart-Devlin debate almost a century later. See Alan Soble, Sexuality, Philosophy Of in
8 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 717, 725 (Edward Craig ed., 1998). "Mill and James
Fitzjames Stephen squared off against each other over this issue in the nineteenth century; in the
twentieth century, the debate was revived, initially by Patrick Devlin and H.L.A. Hart ..... Id.
156. Mill wrote:
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control,
whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principal is, that the sole endfor which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action or any of their
number, is self-protection.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (emphasis
added).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values:
Searchingfor the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Justice White and Chief Justice Burger relied upon what they claimed were historical
conceptions of 'homosexual sodomy "that they assumed informed the framers' vision of
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Claiming to be uninfluenced by their
personalpreferences, these Justices also reliedon the 'presumed beliefof a majority of
the electorate in Georgia that homosexuality is immoral. "' By comparing "homosexual
sodomy" to other crimes, and relying on other sodomy statutes in effect in 1791 and
1868, Justice White also implied that homosexual sodomy is criminally harmful. Similarly, Chief Justice Burger's references to "millennia of moral teaching" implied that
homosexuality is immoral. Justice Powell's concern that a long prison sentence for a
single private, consensual act of homosexual sodomy might violate the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment may reflect a belief that homo-
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lid because homosexuality does not harm others.1 59 Hence, homosexuality falls outside the purview of that which the criminal law may legitimately proscribe.' 60 It is important to mention this contention firstspecifically the premise that homosexuality does not harm othersrights proponents
because a majority of other arguments for 1homosexual
61
implicitly rest upon this no-harm predicate.
A second common argument in support of total decriminalization of
homosexual acts is that individual rights are of paramount importance
and should be fully respected; this includes a right to privacy in sexual
practices whether it be heterosexual or homosexual sex. 162 This approach
draws upon notions of privacy, liberty, and equality, and it seeks to attach itself to constitutional principles.1 63 It asserts that homosexuals have
the same rights under the Constitution as heterosexuals, and that homosexual activity should not be circumscribed simply because it is practiced by a minority of people or is objectionable to some.164 At the outsexuality is an illness, or a perception that it is no longer generally regarded as a serious
crime.
Id. at 1080.
159. "From their [homosexual advocates] perspective of benign sexual variation,homosexuality was a misfortune only because of social intolerance; the condition itself was no more problematic than being left-handed." William N. Eskridge, January 27, 1961: The Birth of Gay Legal
Equality Arguments, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 39, 44 (2001-2003); see also HART, supra note
154, at 13 (discussing the Wolfenden Report which held, by a 12 to I majority, that homosexuality
should no longer be illegal because it causes no harm to others and prostitution should be limited in
its public application only because it is "an offensive nuisance to ordinary citizens").
160. This becomes more interesting in the context of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" dispute because Congress has specifically found that homosexual conduct is detrimental to the military. 10
U.S.C. § 654 (a)(15) (2000).
161. Theoretically, one could argue on the basis of utility that homosexuality is harmful, but
excluding homosexuals from military service is even more harmful to military effectiveness, society, or some other relevant and important interest or concern. I have not found any proponent of
homosexual rights or opponent to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" who takes such a position. See Eskridge,
supranote 159, at 44-46 (discussing Dr. Franklin Kameny's brief to the Supreme Court in which he
argued that homosexuality is a "benign sexual variant" and not a threat and how as a result homosexuals should be afforded various constitutional rights). A table depicting various stereotypical
views of homosexuals compared to Kameny's arguments help to elaborate this point. Id. at 46.
162. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190, 195 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas. 123
S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Hardwick argued that homosexual conduct occurring in the privacy of the home
should be protected under the Constitution because privacy is a fundamental right. Id.
163. John Charles Hayes, Note, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality:
Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L.
REv. 375, 376-77 (1990) (arguing that because homosexuals have historically suffered discrimination, equal protection jurisprudence is applicable). In the words of one lesbian activist following the
Bowers v. Hardwick decision, "We believed in the Constitution. Guess what? It doesn't mean us."
Id. at 375.
164. See id. at 376-78; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Justice Kennedy
stated: "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
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ermost edge of this position is the idea that homosexual orientation is
equated with race.1 65 Accordingly, the denial of homosexual "rights"to engage in sodomy, adopt children, enter into same-sex marriage,
etc.-is wrong, and even to hold the private 66belief that homosexuality is
immoral is equated with bigotry and hatred. 1
A third position, specifically directed in opposition to the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" regime, is that the military should not have a separate
policy allowing it to exclude homosexuals that is contrary to the practice
in the civilian sector. 167 This assertion necessarily depends upon two
premises: 1) that homosexuality is an insufficient basis for criminal
sanction or social exclusion in the general society, 168 and 2) that there
are no special considerations regarding the military that create a sufficient reason-viewed as either a justification or an excuse-for an exception to this rule. 169 Concomitant with this thinking, some subscribing
and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and
more transcendent dimensions." Id. at 2475. He then went on to state, "We conclude the case should
be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution." Id. at 2476.
165. See Michael Mello, For Today I'm Gay: The UnfinishedBattlefor Same Sex Marriagein
Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149,229 (2000) (discussing how race and homosexuality are alike).
166. As Professor Michael Mello stated, speaking through his gay alter ego:
Thus, the argument that same-sex civil marriages would undermine or infect heterosexual marriages consists of nothing more than bigotry tarted up in legalistic doubletalk.
"Take it to the People" is simply a homophobic hate group-albeit a genteel one, not
unlike the White Citizens Councils and other "respectable" segregationists in the Jim
Crow South. Substitute "race" for "homosexuals" in their position, and their bigotry becomes clear. Homophobia enshrouded in "traditional family values" is still homophobia.
As between the two, Randall Terry and "Take it to the People," I much prefer the open
and honest bigotry of Randall Terry. I prefer bigotry raw, not diluted by the base alloys
of hypocrisy and lawyerly doublespeak.
Id. See generally Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1244-45 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S.
640 (2000) (holding that sodomy laws as applied to homosexuals and stereotypical views regarding
homosexuals are invidious and act as vehicles for discrimination).
167.

See SLDN, WHAT IS DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE, DON'T HARASS? (arguing

that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue, Don't Harass policy of the military is unlike any other
federal, state or local law in that it specifically punishes gays and lesbians for their status as homosexuals regardless of whether they act), at
http:www.sldn.org/templates/don't/record.html?section=42&record=749 (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
168. See Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Incorporationand Cinematic Reflections of Psychological Conceptions of Homosexuality, 70 UMKC L. REv. 495, 513 (2002) (explaining that when the
Model Penal Code was developed in the early 1960s, homosexuality was "excepted from criminal
sanctions" on the premise that it is "neither a sin nor an abnormality but only a difference").
169. See Krygowski, supra note 6, at 932 ("Courts have held that previously accepted justifications and military interests can no longer withstand constitutional review."). But see 10 U.S.C. §
654 (a)(7), (8), (15) (2000) (stating Congress' findings that instigated legislation leading to the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
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to this position claim that there is a right to military service, 170 and may
17 1
refer to the ostensibly pro-homosexual policies of other militaries.
They also typically assert that "open" homosexuality is fully compatible
with military service,172 and they generally discount concerns that het170. Some "right to serve" advocates and critics of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" acknowledge that
Congress has the authority to exclude certain people from military service for certain reasons.
The military institution is recognized as a "legitimately unique society" that is not governed by civilian employment principles. Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces."
Pursuant to this power, Congress formulated guidelines that serve as the foundation of
military practices. Additionally, Article I empowers Congress to formulate laws governing the entrance of civilians into the armed forces.
Krygowski, supra note 6, at 878 (citations omitted). These advocates nonetheless criticize the exercise of this authority to exclude individuals on the basis of homosexual orientation or actions. Id. at
932. Congress, on the other hand, has expressed the opposite position, finding that "[t]here is no
constitutional right to serve in the armed forces." 10 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(2) (2000). A more detailed
and thorough discussion of rights and responsibilities, as pertaining to citizenship and military service, is beyond the scope of this article.
171. The adjective "ostensibly" is used in the text because some proponents overstate the prohomosexual policies and practices of some nations' military forces. As the MWG reported, "[t]he
policy and practice of foreign militaries regarding homosexuals actively serving do not always
match." MWG SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 25, at § III, B(5)(a)(1). The MWG observed, "In
countries where policies are 'accepting,' practice typically involves exclusion of homosexuals for
medical/psychological reasons. Even where policy and law allow homosexuals to serve, few servicemembers openly declare their homosexuality due to fears of baiting, bashing, and negative effects to their careers." Id. The MWG also recognized that,
Extended deployments and berthing/billeting privacy are not significant issues for most
foreign militaries. Additionally, no country has as high a proportion of its servicemembers billeted/berthed together on military installations and deployed aboard ships or
overseas at any given time as does the United States. Most importantly, no other country
has the global responsibilities, operational tempo, or worldwide deployment commitments of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Id. at B(5)(a)(2). Indeed, some have even pointed to the more accepting policies of other nations
as posing a potential problem for the United States.
European views on the issue of Gays in the military are progressing toward full acceptance at a quicker pace than appears to be the case in the United States, where Don't
Ask, Don't Tell appears to be a permanent fixture in the American military establishment. The widening gap between civil rights for Gays in the United States versus other
countries of the Western World poses potential problems for the United States. For instance, given the United States' history of using allegations of human rights abuses by
Communist and Third World countries in negotiating economic and political agreements,
laws such as Don't Ask, Don't Tell put American foreign policy at risk for chastisement
by the international community as being hypocritical. Perhaps more fundamentally
threatening to the United States is the fact that the European frontier of civil liberties
may be advancing more quickly than that of the United States, a nation that prides itself
on being the leader of the free world.
See Morris, supra note 5, at 434-35 (citations omitted).
172. As Gary Young writes:
The historical claim that "[h]omosexuality is not compatible with military service" will
no doubt be unpersuasive in the long run. "Incompatibility" is a purely practical claim;
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erosexual service members will feel distressed if required to live in circumstances involving intimate contact (such as showering) 173 with those
who are "openly" homosexual. 74 Based on these arguments, one can
conclude that drawing any distinction between heterosexuals and homosexuals, in either civilian or military society, is equally unsupportable
and unacceptable.
IV. CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY

As the data in this section shows, and in part as a consequence of
these competing philosophical approaches and their tenets, the American
people are divided and conflicted with respect to their beliefs about homosexual rights in general, and military service by homosexuals in particular. Attitudes have generally trended slowly toward greater support
as such it avails only so long as the empirical evidence regarding homosexual participation in the military bears out the problematic consequences cited by the military. It is
easy for homosexuals to refute these claims by pointing out the widespread career successes of homosexuals in the military.
Gary L. Young, Jr., The Price of Public Endorsement: A Reply to Mr. Marcosson, 64 UMKC L.
REV. 99, 104-05 (1995) (citations omitted).
173. As Peter Nixen puts it:
Thus, in the military at least as much as in civilian life, the public activity-whether at
attention or at ease-commands the expected behavior without regard to social orientation. "Opponents [to removing the military ban on gays] argue that the right to privacy
requires keeping the ban in place, citing as examples the difficulty of living in close
quarters and using same-sex showers. But the fact is that gay and straight soldiers have
been thrown together in such situations since the beginning of time. The only question is
whether heterosexual soldiers know about another soldier's homosexuality. How is the
issue of privacy changed depending on whether the gay soldier in the next bunk is closeted or open?"
Peter Nixen, The Gay Blade Unsheathed: Unmasking the Morality of Military Manhood in the
1990s, An Examination of the U.S. Military Ban on Gays, 62 UMKC L. REV. 715, 721-22 (1994)
(quoting David Link, One Rule for Soldiers - Gay or Straight, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, at B7).
174. As one critic of the current military policy writes:
Likewise, the claim that the permissibility of open homosexual identification in the ranks
will undermine unit cohesion also rings hollow. The military's claim is that if the military permits homosexuals to self-identify, heterosexual servicemembers who work
closely with avowed homosexuals will be uncomfortable being forced to work and live
with them.
This is a weak justification for a restriction on open homosexual identification. Americans do not ordinarily formulate restrictions on people's actions based solely upon how
other people might react to them. In the political speech context, for example, the potentially hostile and even violent reaction to a speaker by his enemies is not a sufficient justification for restraining the speaker. Instead, we regulate the heckler's violence, should
it occur. The "heckler's veto" is no more persuasive in the regulation of homosexual
self-identification in the military than it is in the marketplace of ideas.
Young, supra note 172, at 105.
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for "homosexual rights" during the last decade, and there is no strong
and continuing consensus among the public at large regarding whether
homosexuality is immoral, or whether certain specific types of discrimination based on homosexuality ought to be permitted. This section further examines how Americans remain closely divided on whether homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the military, especially if this
involves permitting homosexuals to serve "openly" with respect to their
sexual orientation and behavior.
Although the data varies, most opinion surveys and empirical research indicates that heterosexual Americans generally held negative attitudes toward homosexuals and homosexuality in the decades immediately preceding the inception of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."' 75 A
substantial sample of the research on attitudes toward homosexuality
during this period is collected in a paper by Armando Estrada and David
Weiss, in which the authors catalog the results from over a dozen surveys conducted from the mid-1970s through the early 1990s.1 76 The

sample populations surveyed in the studies vary, with some directed toward the general public and others focusing on students. 177 Differences
in attitude were found between certain population subsets across several
studies; for example, heterosexual men tended to view homosexuality
more negatively than heterosexual women. 78 Based on a review of all
the studies they cited, Estrada and Weiss concluded that, "[i]n sum, surveys of... both the general population and of university students reveal
that attitudes toward homosexuals are negative."' 7 9
In one 1991 survey, 75% of adults believed that same-sex sexual relations are either "always wrong" or "almost always wrong."' 8 A 1991
study of college students, both male and female, found that many respondents had a significant concern that they would be labeled homo175.

See Armando X. Estrada & David J. Weiss, Attitudes of Military Personnel Toward Ho-

mosexuals, at http://instructionall.calstatela.edu/dweiss/Psy542/Attitudes.htm

(last visited Mar. 2,

2004).

176. Id. Many of the surveys cited in this section are discussed in Estrada and Weiss' paper.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men:
Correlates and Gender Differences, 25 J. SEX REs. 451, 452 (1988); Trish Pratte, A Comparative
Study of Attitudes Toward Homosexuality 1986 and 1991, 26 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, 77, 80-81
(1993); James H. Price, High School Students 'Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 52 J. ScH. HEALTH
469, 469 (1982).

179.

Estrada & Weiss, supra note 175, at

http://instructional I .calstatela.edu/dweiss/Psy542/Attitudes.htm
180. Id. "[A] probability sample of non-institutionalized adults (1941 men, 2163 women) aged

18 and older were asked if they believe homosexuality to be 'always wrong, almost always wrong,
sometimes wrong or not wrong."' Id.
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sexual. 8 1 A 1990 survey of college freshmen reported that about half the
respondents considered homosexual men "disgusting" and believed
"homosexual behavior to be plain wrong." 182 Similar attitudes among
high school seniors were disclosed in another study conducted in
1982.183 In this earlier study, respondents tended to agree with the statement "homosexuality was unnatural."' 184 A more comprehensive survey,
which measured attitudes and behavior relating to a variety of sexual isa majority of the respondents
sues between 1974 and 1985, found that
185
viewed homosexuality as an "illness."
Although there is some empirical evidence that suggests public attitudes .toward homosexuality have become increasingly negative over
time, 186 the overwhelming majority of recent studies indicate that the
American public has grown more tolerant, and even sometimes more
approving, of homosexuality. The 2000 National Elections Study (NES),
for example, reflects greater public support for a variety of homosexual
rights initiatives.1 87 In particular, the NES indicates a strong majority of
Americans support laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. 88 Another poll shows that Americans also believe that homo181. Joel W. Wells, Heterosexual University Students ' Perceptionsof Homosexual Behavior, 5
ANNALS SEX RES. 171, 178 (1992).
182. Anthony R. D'Augelli & Melissa L. Rose, Homophobia in a University Community: Attitudes and Experiences of Heterosexual Freshmen, 31 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 484, 487 (1990).
183. Price, supra note 178 at 471 (noting agreement with the statement "homosexuality is unnatural").
184. Id. (noting slightly less agreement with the statements that "homosexuality was a sin" and
"if homosexuality is allowed to increase it will destroy our society").
185. Emil R. Spees, College Students' Sexual Attitudes andBehaviors, 1974-1985: A Review of
the Literature, 28 J.C. STUDENT PERSONNEL 135, 137 (1987). More recent polling similarly indicates that more Americans believe homosexuality is attributable to environment rather than genetics. Frank Newport, Americans Remain More Likely to Believe Sexual OrientationDue to Environment, Not Genetics, The Gallup Organization (July 25, 1998), at
http://gallup.com/poll/releases/pr980725.asp?Version=p.
186. For example, a 1990 study reported that attitudes toward homosexuals had become more
negative from 1986 to 1988, which the authors attributed to AIDS related beliefs. Eugene P. Sheehan et al.,
An Examinationof Change in Reports of AIDS-Related Knowledge and Attitudes in 1986 and 1988,
1990 PSYCHOL. REP. 723, 727-28. Negative attitudes were also reflected in a recent referendum
amending the Colorado state constitution by repealing local ordinances prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships,"
which was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. See Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
187. See generally Alan S. Yang, The 2000 National Elections Study and Gay and Lesbian
Rights: Support for Equality Grows, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Foundation, at
http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/nes2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) [hereinafter NES]. Support for these initiatives vary based on gender, ideological identification, and party affiliation. Id.
188. Id. The NES reports 63.9% favor nondiscrimination laws, 30.9%oppose them, and
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sexual sex between consenting adults should be legal. 189 While a recent
Harris poll reflects the same trend, it finds the public to be much more
closely divided with respect to nondiscrimination legislation. 190 As a recent Gallup poll concludes:
Substantial numbers of Americans continue to say-as they have for
the past quarter century-that homosexual relations should be neither
acceptable nor legal. There have been some changes in these attitudes,

but not enough to signal [a] wholesale shift of societal norms. Gallup
has recorded a gradual increase in the belief that homosexuality is an
acceptable orientation or lifestyle, but this perception has only risen
from 34% in 1977 to 51% today. At the same time, there has been even
less long term change in attitudes about the legality of homosexuality,
with Americans continuing to be closely divided on the question; 52%
think it should be legal today compared to 43% in 1977.191

The NES also found that although a majority of Americans still oppose adoption by homosexuals, support for homosexual adoption has

5.3%are undecided. 1d.
189. One poll shows that 59% of the public says homosexual relations between consenting
adults should be legal, while 37% says they should not be. Frank Newport, Six in 10 Americans
Agree That Gay Sex Should Be Legal, The Gallup Organization (June 27, 2003), at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr030627.asp?Version=p. However, a Gallup poll conducted
shortly thereafter reflects "a significant shift in public opinion on gay and lesbian rights over the
past two months .... [with] a significant drop in the percentage of Americans supporting legalized
homosexual relations." Frank Newport, Public Shifts to More Conservative Stance on Gay Rights,
The Gallup Organization (July 30, 2003), at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr030730.asp?Version=p.
190. The poll found that in 2000, 56% of Americans favored nondiscrimination laws, 34% opposed them, and 6% were undecided. In 1998, 52% favored such laws, 41% opposed them, and 6%
were undecided. Humphrey Taylor, Attitudes to Gays and Lesbians Have Become More Accepting,
But Most People Still Disapproveof Single-Sex Marriage and Adoption by Same Sex Couples, The
Harris Poll #9 (Feb. 9, 2000), at
http://www.harrisinteractive.comfharrispoll/printerfriend/index.asp?PlD=l [hereinafter Harris Poll
#9]. A more recent Harris Poll indicates that, by more than a 2-to-I margin, most Americans favor
legislation to prohibit job discrimination against homosexuals. Humphrey Taylor, By More than 2to-I Most Americans Favor Legislation to ProhibitDiscriminationAgainst Gays and Lesbians, The
Harris Poll #27 (June 13, 2001), at http://harrisinteractive.com/harrispoll/index.asp?PID=236
[hereinafter Harris Poll #27].
191. Frank Newport, Special Report: Homosexuality, The Gallup Organization (Sept. 2002), at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/specialReports/ia0209l 1 ii.asp?Version=p [hereinafter Gallup Poll Sept.
20021. Referring to an earlier Gallup poll, Newport observed, "American attitudes towards homosexuality continue to show change, but in many ways also continue to reflect a lingering reluctance
on the part of the public to consider gay and lesbian behavior to be either acceptable or legal." Frank
Newport, Some Change Over Time in American Attitudes Towards Homosexuality, but Negativity
Remains, The Gallup Organization (Mar. 1, 1999), at
http://wwwgallup.com/poll/releases/pr990301 b.asp?Version=p
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grown considerably since 1992.192 Americans likewise disapprove of
other homosexual advocacy initiatives, such as single-sex marriage 9 3
and employment in certain occupations. 194 Further, a very slight plurality
of Americans continues to believe sexual orientation can be changed
through will power, therapy, or religious convictions. 5
Regarding military service by homosexuals in general, the NES indicates that 71.2% of Americans support this, with only 22.9% opposed
to it, and 5.9% undecided.19 6 Similarly, by a 70% to 26% margin, respondents in a recent Gallup poll indicated that homosexuals should be
"hired" by the armed forces.197 Whether these responses reflect dissatis192. The NES reports that in 2000, 41.4%of Americans supported and 50.5%opposed homosexual adoption. In 1992 (the first year the NES asked the question), 26.3%supported and 68.7%
opposed homosexual adoption. See NES, supranote 187, at
http:l/www.ngltf.org/downloads/nes2000.pdf. Harris Poll #9 reports that in 2000 roughly only 21%
approve of homosexual adoption, while about 56% disapprove; in 1996, about 16% approved and
over 60% disapproved. Harris Poll #9, supra note 190, at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harrispoll/printerfriend/index.asp?PID= I.
193, Harris Poll #9 found that, as of 2000, approximately 56% of Americans disapproved of
single-sex marriage. See Harris Poll #9, supra note 190, at
see also Gallup Poll
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris__poll/printerfriend/index.asp?PID=l;
Sept. 2002, supra note 191, at
http://www.gallup.com/pol/special Reports/la02091 l.asp?version=p ("a majority of Americans
remain opposed to gay marriage, and about half are opposed to the extension of the same types of
benefits married couples receive to gay and lesbian partners joined in civil unions"). Another Gallup
Poll showed that although the public was strongly opposed to same-sex marriage, it was evenly divided in its support for a constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage. Frank Newport, Opposition to Legalized Same-Sex MarriageSteady, The Gallup Organization (Mar. 11, 2004), at
http://www.gallup.com/content/login.aspxci=10960. Another recent Gallup Poll revealed "a relatively widespread perception that [same-sex marriage] would not be good for society." See Heather
Mason, How Would Same-Sex MarriagesAffect Society?, The Gallup Organization (Nov. 11, 2003),
at http://gallup.com/poll/tb/religValue/2003 1111 .asp?Version=p.
Disapproval of same-sex marriage was also reflected in California's Proposition 22 referendum,
effective March 8, 2000, which provides that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid
or recognized in California." Defense of Marriage Act, CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West Supp.
2004).
194. "About four in ten Americans think that gays and lesbians should not be allowed to work
as members of the clergy or as elementary school teachers." Gallup Poll, Sept. 2002, supra note
191, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/specialReports/ia0209l I.asp?version=p..
195. Harris Poll #9 found 46%of Americans believe sexual orientation can be changed, 44% of
Americans believe it cannot be changed, while 10% of Americans didn't know or refused to answer.
Harris Poll #9, supra note 190, at
http://www.harrisinteractives.com/harris poll/index.asp?PID=236.
196. NES, supranote 187, at http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/nes2000.pdf. In comparison, the
results of a 1992 NES, which was conducted eight years earlier, showed that 55.4% supported military service by homosexuals, with 39.2% opposed and 5.4% undecided. Id.
197. Gallup Poll Sept. 2002, supranote 191, at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/specialReports/ia0209l.asp?version=p. A May 2003 Gallup poll reflects that the percentage of Americans who favor the armed forces "hiring" homosexuals has risen
to 80%. Jennifer Robison, Support of Gay Clergy Growing Slowly but Surely, The Gallup Organiza-
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faction with the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is unclear, however, as
the questions used in both the NES and Gallup polls did not specify
whether respondents were expressing an opinion on military service by
"open" homosexuals, or service consistent with "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"
or both.
The data reflects that attitudes are far more negative towards allowing those who are "openly" homosexual to serve in the military. In a
2000 Gallup poll, only 41% supported homosexuals serving "openly" in
the military, while 38% supported the current policy, and 17% favored
an outright ban.' 98 In a 2000 Harris poll, 46% of respondents opposed
the current "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, with 34% in favor the policy, and 20% undecided. 199 A recent study by Miller and Williams found
56.4% favoring "open" service by homosexuals, with 36.7% opposed
and 6.9% having no opinion .2 00 Even among a group of respondents who
strongly support homosexuals serving in the military, a majority favored
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" approach as compared to a policy that allowed for their "open" service.2 °t
More important than the results of any particular study or survey is
the overall picture that they collectively portray. The accumulated data,
discussed herein, reflects that the American public remains deeply divided and even conflicted about homosexuality in general, and military

tion, at http://www.gallup.com/pollltb/religValue/20030722b.asp?Version=p (July 22, 2003). Both
of these polls may overestimate the public's support for military service by homosexuals, however,
because of the curious way in which the questions were posed. Both of the Gallup polls' use of the
term "hire," which might suggest that the questions concern the "hiring" of civilian employees by
the armed forces rather than the enlistment or appointment of uniformed personnel. Id.; Gallup Poll
Sept. 2002, supra note 191, at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/specialReports/ia020911 .asp?version=p.
198. See GALLUP POLL 2000, supra note 12, at
http://www.defensedaily.com/reports.pub opinion.htm. Four percent had no opinion. Id.
199. News Release, Harris Interactive, A Call to Attention on Gays in the Military: Is It Time
to Revise "Don't Ask, Don't Tell?" (Feb. 15, 2000), at
http://www.harrisinteractive.comlnews/downloads/pr~glmil.pdf. Of those who responded that they
favored the current policy, 35% actually support a more stringent policy of prohibiting all homosexuals from serving in the military. Id.
200. Laura L. Miller & John Allen Williams, Do Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality
Undermine Combat Effectiveness?, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND

AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 361, 378 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn, eds., 2001).
201. On August 27, 2001, Zogby International and Hamilton College in New York released the
results of a nation-wide Hamilton College Gay Issues Poll, involving a random sampling of 1000
"class of 2001" high school graduates. Although 92% of the respondents said homosexuals ought to
be allowed to serve in the military, they preferred by a 52% to 40% margin the current "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy to "open" service by homosexuals. Dennis Gilbert, Hamilton College Gay Issues
Poll, Hamilton College, at http://www.hamilton.edu/printable.cfm (Aug. 27, 2001).
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service by homosexuals in particular.2 °2 Although the public strongly favors nondiscrimination against homosexuals in the abstract, it clearly
supports discriminating on the basis of homosexuality in certain circumstances. 203 More specifically, the public seems far less receptive to the
idea of homosexuals serving "openly" in the military than it does to the
notion of military service by homosexuals in general.20 4 Put another
way, the public's complex and even paradoxical attitudes and beliefs
about homosexuality seem, in many ways, to be reflected in the legislation and implementation of policies and regulations that comprise the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" more closely
comports with contemporary attitudes toward homosexuality than would
the ideologically pristine alternatives of either an outright ban against
military service by homosexuals, or alternatively, removing all distinctions between heterosexuals and homosexuals and allowing homosexuals to serve "openly."
The data also confirms that there is a stunning gap-in reality, a
chasm-between civilian and military elites on issues relating to sexual
orientation. 0 5 Miller and Williams found that among civilian elites,
54.3% favored allowing homosexuals to serve "openly" in the military,
while 35.6% opposed it, and 10.1% had no opinion.20 6 In sharp contrast,
among military elites, only 18.1% favored military service by those who
are "openly" homosexual, while 72.8% opposed it, and 9.1% had no
opinion. 207 This gap between civilian and military attitudes is also reflected in other studies. 20 8 As Miller and Williams conclude:
Military leaders surveyed were less concerned with the effect of gender
integration than they were about the possibility of known gay men and
lesbians being allowed to serve among the troops. Civilian leaders and
respondents from the general public demonstrated a greater concern
about the impact of gender than did the military elite, but they were far
less worried about the incorporation of homosexuals than were military
elites. Given the similarity of responses among military elites, reserv-

202. See discussion supra Part IV.
203. See discussion supra Part IV.
204. See discussion supra Part IV.
205. Miller & Williams, supra note 200, at 378.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Bicknell, supra note 35, at 51 (naval officers are less tolerant of homosexuals in
the military than the general public).
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it is clear that military service has an
ists, officer trainees, and veterans,
209
effect on.attitudes on this issue.
The civil-military gap is also a consequence of the all-volunteer
force, which causes the military to be self-selecting, and tends to perpetuate and reinforce attitudes and values traditionally held by the military culture.2'0 This attitudinal gulf with respect to homosexuality portends that any liberalized policy toward homosexual service imposed
upon the military by civilian elites could prove to be especially problematic within the ranks, and could seriously harm recruiting and retention."'
V. IN DEFENSE OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
As previously discussed, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" cannot be supported as an expression of pristine principle, because it is rife with inconsistencies and incongruities, which are in no small part traceable to
the absence of an underlying moral consensus. The gist of the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" approach can nonetheless be defended as a comparatively practical and reasonable approach to a momentous matter that is
not yet ripe for a definitive and principled resolution. It is a compromise
solution, which was appropriately born of a political process and generally reflects contemporary public attitudes.
The question of military service by homosexuals can, as a matter of
normative first principle, be addressed in one of two ways. Each is a
logical extension of the opposing positions in the morale debate about
homosexuality itself. One resolution, based on the traditional or natural
law approach, is logically derived from the belief that homosexuality is
objectively immoral. It follows from this that lawmakers can prudentially decide to exercise their legitimate authority to criminalize immoral
behavior-in this case consensual homosexual conduct-in order to deter harmful conduct, promote the common good, and influence people to
212
be more virtuous. 2 Lawmakers could likewise decide to impose admin-

209. Miller & Williams, supra note 200, at 386.
210. See Richard D. Hooker, Jr., Soldiers of the State: ReconsideringAmerican Civil-Military
Relations, PARAMETERS, U.S. ARMY WAR C. Q. 4, at

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03winter/hooker.htm

(Winter 2003-2004); see also

Lindsay Cohn, The Evolution of the Civil-Military "Gap " Debate, at 7, 10, at

http://www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/cohnliteraturereview.pdf (1999).
211. See Cohn, supra note 210, at 11, at
http://www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/cohn_literaturereview.pdf.
212. As traditionally and correctly understood, all legitimate laws, including criminal laws, are

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol21/iss2/2

44

Milhizer: "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": A Qualified Defense
20041

A Qualified Defense

istrative sanctions and other restrictions upon individuals because they
engage in or have a propensity to engage in harmful and immoral conduct, including prohibiting them from serving in the military. This
would constitute a rational exercise of legislative prerogative, especially
given the substantial (albeit conflicting) support for such action provided
by the data and opinions pertaining to military service by homosexuals.21 3 Of course, a contrary judgment, allowing unencumbered military
service by homosexuals, could likewise be adopted based on the same
information. The Constitution grants to Congress the authority to make
such decisions about the armed forces. 2 14 Thus any rational judgment by
Congress in military matters, especially if it is to adopt a policy that is
explicitly in accord with an objective moral truth, is constitutionally defensible in this representative democracy. 1 5 Further, in order to implement such a decision effectively, lawmakers could require that the miliderived from and consistent with moral principles and norms. This is not to suggest that the criminal
law's proper purpose is to codify morality, i.e., to describe comprehensively moral behavior and
punish all departures from it. Much of what is deemed immoral is left unregulated because of countervailing interests involving individual liberty and freedom, because the conduct is not sufficiently
harmful to society to warrant regulation or punishment, or because of other prudential reasons. For
example, although lying is immoral, the criminal law stigmatizes only certain lies that are especially
harmful, such as perjury and false official statements. This traditional understanding of law and morality also recognizes that some laws, such as traffic regulations, lack an obvious moral content, and
that the body of law must regulate the mundane as well as the profound. There is no doubt, however, that a proper understanding of the inter-relationship between law and morality recognizes that
the former's very legitimacy depends upon its adherence to and consistency with moral norms. The
positive law, as properly understood, is a derivative and selective extension and expression of the
moral law that undergirds it. This explains the Supreme Court's traditional willingness to uphold the
constitutionality of laws that advance public morals. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 444-45, 452 (1961) (upholding a Maryland law requiring certain businesses to close on Sundays). In the words of Professor Chemerinsky, "[T]he government has a legitimate purpose [to legislate] if it advances a traditional 'police' purpose: protecting public safety, public health, or public
morals." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 536 (1997).
213. The very nature of the matter under consideration-the impact, if any, on military effectiveness by the service of "open" homosexuals-makes it a difficult subject for empirical research,
and thus much of the "data" available to decision makers is necessarily in the form of opinion. See
Nathaniel Frank, Real Evidence on Gays in the Military, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2002, at A25. It is
certainly fair to say, however, that the opinion evidence offered in support of reinstituting or completely removing the ban is mixed. For a collection of opinion evidence opposed to relaxing the traditional ban against military service by homosexuals, see Senate Debate on Homosexuals in the
Military, 139 CONG. REC. S13,517-21 (daily ed. June 22, 1993) (statement of Sen. Coats).
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I1.
215. Of course, mere rationality may not suffice if Congress decided to discriminate with respect to a fundamental right. Even then, discrimination such as that found in the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" regime may pass constitutional muster under the applicable strict scrutiny test. See generally
infra notes 218-22 (describing Supreme Court jurisprudence pertaining to fundamental rights, strict
scrutiny, judicial deference, morals legislation, and the potential impact of Lawrence, with respect
to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell").
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tary aggressively investigate allegations of homosexuality, and, that recruits and military personnel be questioned and screened based on their
sexual conduct, and perhaps, their orientation and predisposition,2 6 consistent with the constitutional right against compelled selfincrimination.2 17 All of this is contingent, either directly or indirectly, on
the premise that homosexuality is objectively. immoral.
The second resolution, based on the latitudinarian approach, begins
with the premise that private and consensual homosexuality is not objectively immoral or intrinsically harmful, but rather that it is deserving of
constitutional protection as a fundamental right. 21 8 It follows from this
216. The state, of course, would not be required to implement any particular policy with respect to homosexuals, as such an initiative lies with the discretion of its legislature. To act on the
basis of homosexual orientation alone, the state would have to conclude orientation itself was harmful, or that it was closely enough related to harmful conduct such that it was a rational basis for acting.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-65 (1966) (expounding on the significance of the privilege against self-incrimination).
218. The Supreme Court has used several methods for determining whether a right is "fundamental." One older test is relatively narrow and seems to reflect natural law philosophy in requiring
that the right be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
324-25 (1937) (holding that a state is not required to adopt a right if it were not of the crux of ordered liberty, and its repudiation would not encroach on the American peoples' concept of "fundamental"). Another narrow test is more culturally based, requiring that such a right be "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (relying in
part on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which recognized Western culture's strong traditions). A newer test.for fundamental rights is more expansive and abstract, and seems to reflect latitudinarian thinking; it is concerned with "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy... the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (recognizing the right of individuals to be unencumbered from govemmental interference into those circumstances "so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child"). The recent Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003) decision is muddled in regard to the rationale for the Court's reversal of the Texas sodomy statute, and thus it is not at all clear what, if anything, Lawrence would have to say about the
constitutionality of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime. Lawrence certainly overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), but its reasoning for doing so is open to different interpretations.
While it may be that Lawrence holds that engaging in consensual sodomy is a fundamental right
consistent with the Casey approach, it may be simply that Lawrence invalidated the statute in Bowers using some form of rational basis analysis. It does seem clear that the Lawrence court rejected
equal protection as a rationale for overruling Bowers in its repudiation of the argument that those
who engage in homosexual sex, or homosexuals generally, constitute a suspect class. For purposes
of the latitudinarian argument discussed here, it is assumed that Lawrence found a fundamental right
to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy. It is also assumed that Lawrence did not invalidate all
morals legislation, and that the Court's decision can in fact be applied consistent with the axiom
holding that "that which is deemed authoritatively immoral cannot be deemed constitutional." In
other words, constitutional rights of dubious morality (such as the right to an abortion) are necessarily premised on the proposition that the underlying conduct has not been authoritatively judged to be
immoral. Rather, the morality of such conduct is treated as a private matter, judgments about which
ought not be imposed on others. Although a more detailed discussion of Lawrence and its impact is
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that the state may not prohibit or unduly regulate such activities and ex219
pression, at least in the absence of a compelling reason for doing so.
Leaving aside questions of judicial deference with respect to military
22
the syllogism continues that a sufficient case has not been
matters,20
made for discriminating against homosexuals with respect to military
service, precisely because the data and opinions relating to the costs and
benefits of disallowing military service by homosexuals is so sharply
conflicting. 22 Accordingly, the ban should be lifted because it is unconstitutional and unprincipled, and thus "open" homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the armed forces within the same parameters as heterosexuals. All of this flows, either directly or indirectly, from the premise
that homosexuality is not objectively immoral. 2
beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces has granted review on the issue of whether Lawrence overrules Article 125 of the
U.C.M.J. with respect to consensual sodomy in United States v. Marcum, ACM 34216, 2002 CCA
LEXIS 173 (Jul. 25, 2002). See United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Daily Journal
No. 03-219, availableat
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/journal/2003Jml/2003Aug.htm (Aug. 23, 2003).
219. The state may legislate to limit a fundamental right only if its action can pass "strict scrutiny" analysis. This requires the state to demonstrate that the governmental interest is "compelling,"
and that the means chosen to achieve the end (i.e., the statute and implementing policy in the case of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell") are "necessary" and "narrowly tailored." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 212,
at 416. Even when the Supreme Court has used the strict scrutiny analysis with respect to military
matters, it has "employed special deference and respect for the judgment and reasoning of military
leaders due to the national security implications of the case." James M. Winner, Comment, Beds
with Sheets but No Covers: The Right to Privacy and the Military's Regulation ofAdultery, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1098 (1997) (commenting on Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
which applied strict scrutiny to an exclusion order and held such order justified by a wartime emergency, and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), which affirmed the reversal of a free exercise of religion claim in deference to the military's compelling interest in headgear uniformity).
220. The Supreme Court has instructed that "[j]udicial deference.., is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and
regulations for their governance is challenged." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986)
(quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)); see Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435,
436, 441, 447-48, 450-51 (1987), overruling O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (deferring
to Congress' determinations concerning disciplinary needs of the military); Orloff v. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, 90, 92 (1953) (deferring to the Army's determination with respect to personnel matters). As these and other cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court "give[s] great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military
interest." Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507. See generally John F. O'Connor, The Origins and Application
of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161 (2000).
221. See supra note 161.
222. There is a third approach, which rejects the idea of objective truths relating to homosexuality. It would hold that the question of military service by homosexuals, like any other legislative
or policy choice, is simply a matter of majority consensus, based on certain criteria (such as utilitarian cost versus benefit analysis), as expressed through political mechanisms. Put another way, might
makes right, and law and policy is no more than an imposition of efficacious will. See Bowers, 478
U.S. at 192-94, 196; Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L.
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These summaries of the competing approaches are, concededly,
simplistic and rudimentary. They underestimate both the sophistication
of the principles involved and the intricacies and potential variation of
their applications. But they do sketch the framework and parameters for
two diametrically opposed-albeit internally principled and reasonable-approaches to military service by homosexuals. In addition, these
two approaches and their variants are the only options that truly embody
normative first principles. Any other approach-such as the current
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime-is, in comp arison, philosophically and
ideologically infirm.
Upon what basis can the philosophically and ideologically infirm
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" approach be countenanced, let alone justified?
The defense begins with the proposition that authoritatively adopting ei*ther of the competing principled alternatives described above would
constitute a paradigm shift from the unsettled status quo. Choosing one
of these two principles would represent more than a mere modification
of military policy-it would necessarily amount to choosing sides in a
hot spot in the so-called "culture war' 22 3 and confer upon one set of beliefs the imprimatur of societal norm. This would be widely and correctly seen as constituting a profound and authoritative normative judgment having far-reaching significance and implications. It would, in
short, be a fundamental statement about who we are as a society and
where we are going (and ought to go) in the future.
Prudence counsels that sea-changing normative declarations should
normally be made only when they are in accord with the culture (or at
least are not counter-cultural), and then only by democratic institutions
that reflect society and are directly accountable to the people. Criminalizing murder, rape, and, robbery, for example, is unremarkable in contemporary America. The same is true for incest (even if only involving
adults), carnal knowledge, bestiality, and polygamy. This is because in
each case, a critical mass of Americans agrees that such behavior is immoral and harmful, and that the law may be used to discourage and punish it. Even though individual Americans may arrive at these conclusions
based on widely divergent rationales, moral legislation is nonetheless infused with practical legitimacy when a solid majority of the public
REv. 801, 873-76 (1992-1993). Such an approach, however, would be rejected on principle by the
principled proponents on both sides of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" issue.
223. The term "culture war" has become a ubiquitous reference to the clash between traditional
and latitudinarian approaches and arguments toward questions of morals and values. See, e.g.,
ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH (1996); CHARLES E. RICE, THE WINNING
SIDE (1999).
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agrees that the proscribed conduct is immoral and deserving of criminal
sanctions.
Of course, sometimes the popular culture is unambiguously wrong
as a matter of objective truth. In such circumstances there is a salutary
benefit, and perhaps even an obligation for lawmakers to become leaders
in moving an unreceptive or resistant society toward that which is true.
For example, race-based slavery and racial discrimination are and have
always been, as an unequivocal matter of principle, immoral. 2 4 The proponents of racial discrimination could never point to any legitimate basis
for their position, in the natural law or elsewhere, because none exists. 225
Likewise, racists have never been able to cite any authentic Christian authority that supports their beliefs; such sentiments are self-evidently immoral, and the Church has never authoritatively taught otherwise.2 26
224. According to genuine Christian teachings, "The equality of men rests essentially on their
dignity as persons and the rights that flow from it... ." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 470

§ 1935 (United States Catholic Conference, Inc., trans., Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1994). Specifically with respect to racial discrimination, the Catholic Church instructs, "With respect to the fundamental fights of the person, every type of discrimination, whether social or cultural, whether
based on sex, race, color, social condition, language or religion, is to be overcome and eradicated as
contrary to God's intent." Gaudium et Speo, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem
World, Pope Paul VI § 29 (Dec. 7, 1965), available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/histcouncil/documents/vat-iicons_196. On the other hand, certain
utilitarian arguments could be made to justify racism. Indeed, under the right conditions certain
types of utilitarianism could conceivably justify almost anything, including punishing the innocent
and slavery. See generally Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed.-Utilitarianismand Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115 (2000); R.M. Hare, What is Wrong with Slavery, 8
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 103 (Winter 1979).
225. Perhaps one of the greatest contemporary expressions of the natural law is found in Dr.
Martin Luther King's moving Letter from the Birmingham Jail, in which Dr. King champions racial
equality. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. WHY CAN'T WE WAIT 77-100 (1964).
226. This is not to deny that religion and the Bible have been misused from time-to-time to
justify immoral beliefs and acts, such as slavery and racism. During the period of slavery in the
American South, Paul's letter to Philemon, among other passages from the Bible, was used to justify race-based slavery. See Philemon 1:16; see Martin v. Roy, No. 93-07137, 1998 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 703, at *5 (Mass. 1998) (citing plaintiff's opinion that "Jews, like others, resorted to the Bible to rationalize slavery"). More recently, the trial judge in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
invoked religion in explaining the rationale for Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."'
Id. at 3. But repeating this false reliance on a religious justification for that which is objectively immoral does not make it so. Authentic Christianity unambiguously teaches that slavery and racism
are always wrong: "The seventh commandment forbids acts or enterprises that for any reasonselfish or ideological, commercial, or totalitarian-lead to the enslavement of human beings .... "
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 224, at § 2414. Further, in his letter to Philemon, Paul directed a Christian master to treat his Christian slave "no longer as a slave but more than
a slave, a beloved brother ... both as a man and in the Lord." Philemon 1: 16. Religion and the Bible
have also been misused to justify a number of'other immoral beliefs or actions, including anti-
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Racist sentiments are self-evidently immoral. With respect to matters
such as these involving immutable norms, a lawmaker could prudently
decide to get ahead of the curve and try to move the culture to a better
place.
But even where the circumstances are morally clear, radical change
does not occur in a cultural vacuum and may have great costs. Slavery
was ended in America only in exchange for much bloodshed and misery,
and putting the very existence of the nation in jeopardy.227 Even today,
laws and policies designed to end racial discrimination are, in some
sense, only as efficacious as the culture will allow and accept. Certainly,
the Fourteenth Amendment 228 and anti-discrimination laws have helped
ameliorate racial discrimination and made American society more moral,
even if this was accomplished over the objection of some Americans. 229
When the driving first principle is unequivocally moral, then any consequential friction and dissonance can be deemed a cost worth bearing.
Determining how far and how fast to move toward a moral imperative,
and the acceptability of the costs occasioned by the pace, is essentially a
prudential judgment committed to the legitimate decision-making authority. 30
But different normative dynamics are at play in the case of discrimination based on homosexuality as compared to discrimination
based on race, especially as this relates to military service. 231 This can be
Semitism, sexism, war, the burning of witches and "heretics," anti-Catholic sentiment (especially
toward immigrant peoples), white supremacy, and environmental irresponsibility. Of course, because religion and the Bible have been misused for these purposes does not mean that all theological
and biblical references to morality, such as disapproving of homosexuality, are necessarily false or
disingenuous.
227. Sandra Beth Zellmer, SacrificingLegislative Integrity at the Altar of AppropriationsRiders: A Constitutionality Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 457, 529 (1997).
228. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Amendment, which was designed to address slavery and
racial discrimination, provided, inter alia, for due process and equal protection under law. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982).
229. See Connie C. Flores, Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX. A Solution to
Peer Sexual Harassment, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 153, 174 n. 114 (1997) (citing GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601 (12th ed. 1991)).
230. President Truman's order to racially desegregate the military was unquestionably a moral
statement. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948). See Lesbians and Gay Men in
the U.S. Military: HistoricalBackground, supra note 15, at
http://psychology.ecdavis.edu/rainbow/htmlI/military history.html. History nonetheless suggests that
the pace of desegregation in the armed forces was related in great part to considerations of military
necessity, perceived or real. See Rhonda Evans, A History of the Service of Ethnic Minoritiesin the
U.S. Armed Forces, Center for Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, at
http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.eduPublications/evans Minority200306_I.htm (June 26, 2003) (discussing resistance to segregation before and after the Order).
231. Important differences between race, and sexual orientation and conduct, can be readily
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illustrated with a simple and practical example involving policy implementation. One could hypothesize that no moral American-either now
or at the time of President Truman's executive order to end racial segregation in the military-would question a requirement that military personnel be instructed that a belief in racial superiority is objectively immoral, and that such an attitude will not be tolerated in the ranks. This
not only makes good practical sense, but it also expresses an objective
moral truth.
Now consider a requirement that military personnel be instructed
that homosexual conduct is either objectively moral or objectively immoral, and that any dissent from the newly established orthodoxy is not
permitted. Is there any doubt that such an approach to homosexuality
would engender staunch opposition from a considerable number of respectable Americans? Is there any question that such indoctrination
would contravene protected religious freedom, as this is now understood, and would cause significant practical problems for the armed
forces? The best that could be hoped for, consistent with the spectrum of
attitudes held by Americans today, is instruction that emphasizes the importance of respecting privacy, tolerating different sexual orientations
and views toward homosexuality, and opposing harassment or maltreatment based on sexual orientation. This is precisely the sort of lowestcommon-denominator accommodation that typifies the present "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" approach.
It is quite a different matter to impose a radically new and different
moral compact absent moral consensus, or even some agreement as to
what is intended and the reasons for it. Regardless of one's position on
the question of the morality and constitutionality of homosexuality, one
would have to acknowledge that the opposing view is not baseless and
has a significant constituency. This is not an argument for the moral
equivalence of the opposing beliefs. Proponents on both sides advocate
from the premise of moral certainty, and, as an irreducible matter of
logic, one of the two mutually inconsistent views must be morally superior to the other. But the certainty and seriousness of the irreconcilable
beliefs involved provides further support for the proposition that it

drawn. Race is an immutable characteristic; sexual orientation and action is a behavior and a choice,
which can change over time. Further, race is a necessarily "open" aspect of a person; sexuality need
not be "open." See generally Eugene T. Gomulka, Homosexuality in Uniform: Is It Time?, 30 FIRST
THINGS J. RELIGION & PUB. LIFE 41-42 (Feb. 1993) (comparing and contrasting discrimination
based on race and homosexuality), at
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/f19302/articles/gomulka.html. A fuller discussion of the differences between race, and sexual orientation and conduct, are beyond the scope of this article.
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would be precipitous, perhaps even reckless, for lawmakers to decide,
authoritatively and categorically, here and now, in favor of one or the
other.
It would be even more dubious for the courts to intervene and seek
to settle this cultural dispute, given that the culture is so deeply divided
based on principle. The Congress and the President are "popularly"
elected and popularly accountable, and thus their actions ought to be
both reflective of and responsive to the will of the people.23 2 Federal
judges are, for good reason, far more insulated from public opinion and
attitudes.23 3 Their role is to interpret the laws made by the representatives of the people, and not to choose sides in the popular debate.23 4
Unless a law or policy is clearly unconstitutional, the role of the court
should be to interpret and faithfully apply it, and not to disapprove of it
based on philosophical differences dressed up as constitutional interpretation. 5 Virtually any approach to the issue of military service by homosexuals-be it a complete ban, the end to all restrictions, or the intermediate "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime--ought to pass constitutional
muster by an appropriately deferential court.
Proponents on both sides of the issue would have to concede that
the moral debate is not a simple matter of esoterica or high philosophy,
which resides above and beyond the public's collective consciousness.
The American people are engaged on issues pertaining to homosexuality, and a critical mass of Americans are presently unwilling to accept
fully either ideological absolute, with all of its attendant implications
and consequences. Rather, the public seems deeply conflicted about homosexuality, especially when questions about individual privacy and
military service are mixed into the equation. This is contested terrain in
the culture war, and the battle for hearts and minds of the American public has been actively joined. Recasting military policy consistent with either of the opposing views would represent a great victory for one of the
232. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also Committee of Seventy,
How the System Really Works: The Electoral College (Oct. 1996), at

http://www.seventy.org/nycu/1996/electoral.html (explaining how the President, although elected
using an electoral college system, is indirectly elected by popular vote, and therefore, his election is
an adequate representation of the popular election of each state).
233. See Scott D. Weiner, PopularJustice: State JudicialElections and ProceduralDue Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REv. 187, 203 (1996); Understandingthe Federal Courts, The Constitution and the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.uscourts.gov/understand02/contentl 0.html (last

visited Mar. 2,2004).
234.

See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); U.S. v. Thomas, 699 F. Supp.

147, 149, 151 (1988).
235.

See Understandingthe FederalCourts, supra note 233, at

http://www.uscourts.gov/understand02/content

1_0.html.
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competing protagonists, for obvious reasons. But an ideological triumph
for either side at the present time-especially for proponents of lifting
the ban-would likely be at the expense of the best interests of military
effectiveness. It is the best interests of the military, and not some broader
philosophical agenda, that ought to be the touchstone for military personnel policy, at least when the moral underpinnings of an issue are in
popular dispute. Prudence suggests that lawmakers should wait for the
fog of culture war to lift and the political dust to settle before stamping
their imprimatur upon either of the antithetical first principles that lead
to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" compromise.
VI. CONCLUSION

Perhaps my initial, disparaging characterization of the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" regime needs to be reconsidered in light of the above commentary. The inconsistencies and incongruities of the present regime
may simply be an accurate and appropriate reflection of an ambivalent
and unsettled American body politic, which has reached no definitive
consensus regarding the morality and acceptability of homosexuality.
Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that a contemporary resolution of the normative questions implicated by "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"
made by those who can be held politically accountable, would fall short
of resolving or even addressing the irreconcilable ideologies at play. In
other words, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is more akin to a yellow yield
sign, a sort of philosophical armistice that warns those on both sides of
the ideological impasse to proceed with caution.
When all is said and done, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," or some refined variation of it, is probably the best that can be hoped for at the present time. It accommodates, albeit uneasily, the strongly held and
sharply opposing views of those who care the most. It comports, generally, with a divided and unsure American public. It can be internalized
and implemented, without unbearable cost, by military leaders and the
distinct and special society they lead. It defers, in principle and in practice, to legitimate values involving privacy and religious freedom. And,
as nearly all would agree, it is not a permanent solution.
Someday, perhaps sooner rather than later, lawmakers will be able
to definitively act, based on unambiguous first principle, in fashioning a
policy for homosexual service in the military. It will be coherent and
consistent. It will express ideological clarity. It will harmonize the
criminal law, administrative sanctions and actions, and practical implementation. It will be widely supported by the American public, and by
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those who serve in harm's way. It will be better than what we have now
because the times will allow for a better approach. That day will no
doubt come, but it has yet to arrive.
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